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We exploit a unique natural experiment—recent restrictions of dark trading in Canada and 
Australia—and proprietary trade-level data to analyze the effects of dark trading.  Disaggregating 
two types of dark trading, we find that dark limit order markets are beneficial to market quality, 
reducing quoted, effective and realized spreads and increasing informational efficiency.  In 
contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that dark midpoint crossing systems significantly 
affect market quality.  Our results support recent theory that dark limit order markets encourage 
aggressive competition in liquidity provision.  We discuss implications for the regulation of dark 
trading and tick sizes. 
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While trading without pre-trade transparency has long been a feature of equity markets in 
the form of upstairs block trading, the recent emergence of automated dark pools for smaller sized 
non-transparent orders has attracted the attention of regulators worldwide.  Dark pools have been 
very successful in attracting order flow; they account for approximately 15% of US consolidated 
volume, 10% in Europe, 14% in Australia, and 10% in Canada.
1
  Proponents argue dark pools 
offer several advantages such as the ability to avoid large orders being front run, reduced 
information leakage, and lower market impact costs. 
The rapid growth in dark trading has caused considerable concern, especially among 
market regulators.  For example, the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman in a 
recent speech said “transparency has long been a hallmark of the US securities markets, and I am 
concerned by the lack of it in these dark venues”.
2
  Many regulators and policymakers including 
the SEC, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR), and the European Commission have made proposals and 
conducted public consultations regarding dark trading, but have been hesitant in introducing new 
regulations.  Their hesitance reflects the scarcity of evidence on the costs and benefits of dark 
pools and how the costs/benefits are distributed between market participants.  This study aims to 
address this problem by empirically analyzing the impact of dark trading on market quality. 
We exploit the unique natural experiment created by the introduction of minimum price 
improvement rules for dark trading in Canada in October 2012 (the first such regulation in the 
world) and Australia in May 2013.  The rules require that dark trades provide one full tick of 
price improvement (or half a tick if the spread is constrained at one tick).  When the rules came 
into effect, dark trading fell by over one-third in both countries, literally overnight.  Using the 
regulation as our main source of exogenous variation in dark trading, and proprietary trade-level 
data from dark trading venues, we analyze the causal impact of dark trading on liquidity and 
informational efficiency.  Our empirical design overcomes the endogeneity issues that have thus 
far hindered the empirical analysis of dark trading and market quality.   
                                                          
1
 The US estimate is from Rosenblatt Securities for April 2013.  The Europe estimate is for July 2013 using 
Thomson Reuters data as reported by the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-
20130812-701291.html).  The Australian estimate is from the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Report 331 for the September quarter 2012 and includes some internalization.  The Canadian 
estimate combines statistics from the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and 
proprietary data obtained for this study and corresponds to the period August-December 2012. 
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We disaggregate dark trading into two types that theory suggests should have different 
effects.  The first is dark trading at a single price such as the midpoint of the national best bid and 
offer (NBBO).  We refer to this type of dark trading as ‘one-sided’ because at any point in time 
dark liquidity can only exist on either the buy- or the sell-side, but not both.  One-sided dark 
trading is characterized by a relatively low execution probability (particularly for traders that tend 
to cluster on one side of the market, such as informed traders), the absence of profitable dark 
market making strategies due to the zero dark spread, and imperfect concealment of trading 
intentions because probing orders can infer the direction of the dark order imbalance.  The second 
type, ‘two-sided’ dark trading is when dark liquidity can co-exist at different prices on both the 
buy- and sell-sides of the market, and more closely resembles a dark limit order market.  In 
contrast to one-sided dark trading, traders in a two-sided dark market can instantly execute both 
buys and sells as long as dark liquidity exists, can profit from dark liquidity provision strategies, 
and can better conceal their trading intentions. 
Our main finding is that two-sided dark trading, in moderate levels, is beneficial to 
liquidity and informational efficiency.  It tends to lower quoted, effective and realized spreads, 
reduces price impact measures of illiquidity, and makes prices closer to the random walk that is 
expected under informational efficiency.  The magnitudes of these effects are economically 
meaningful and qualitatively similar in both Canada and Australia.  Two-sided dark trading is 
associated with lower lit market depth in Canada, although this effect is small compared to the 
effects on spreads and is not present in the Australian data where we find that two-sided dark 
trading increases depth.  We show that the reduction in Canadian lit market depth is consistent 
with the notion that when trading activity is split across multiple venues, so too is depth, without 
necessarily decreasing the total depth across all venues.   
In contrast to the beneficial effects of two-sided dark trading, we do not find consistent 
evidence that one-sided (midpoint) dark trading has a significant effect on market quality.  While 
it may benefit some aspects of market quality, it can be harmful to others. 
Aggregating across the two types of dark trading, our results suggest that dark trading is 
more likely to benefit market quality the greater the proportion of two-sided dark trading.  
Furthermore, changes in the composition of dark trading can impact market quality even if the 
aggregate level remains unchanged.  An increase in two-sided dark trading relative to the level of 
one-sided dark trading is likely to benefit market quality.  Our results are robust to a range of 
alternative specifications, fixed effects, sub-period tests, a variety of control variables including 
matching stocks in a control market, and are qualitatively similar for both the largest and smallest 
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stocks, with stronger effects in smaller stocks.  The similarity of the main results in Canada and 
Australia provides evidence on the robustness of the effects of dark trading. 
Our results have support in the theoretical literature. The positive effect of two-sided dark 
trading (dark limit order markets) on market quality is consistent with a number of models that 
analyze pre-trade transparency in limit order markets.  For example, Boulatov and George (2013) 
find that dark limit order markets encourage informed traders to supply liquidity because they can 
profit from doing so without revealing their private information.  Transparency makes them 
reluctant to supply liquidity because other traders gain an informational advantage by observing 
the limit order schedules before deciding how to trade.  Boulatov and George (2013) show that 
opacity in limit order markets not only increases liquidity but also leads to more aggressive 
informed trading, which improves informational efficiency.  Our results suggest that strong 
competition in providing dark liquidity has positive spillover effects on the lit market, where 
liquidity providers are forced to narrow spreads to compete with dark liquidity. 
In contrast, theory identifies reasons why one-sided (midpoint) dark trading can have less 
favorable effects on liquidity.  For example, Zhu (2014) shows that informed traders are less 
likely than uninformed traders to use dark midpoint markets because their tendency to cluster on 
the same side of the market results in low execution probability in the dark.  The increased 
concentration of informed traders in the lit market increases adverse selection risks and harms 
liquidity.  While we do not find that midpoint (one-sided) dark trading consistently harms 
liquidity, our results indicate that midpoint dark trading is not as beneficial to liquidity as two-
sided dark trading, consistent with an opposing increase in adverse selection risks. 
This paper makes two major contributions to the recent empirical studies of dark trading.  
It is the first to identify and exploit a unique natural experiment as part of its identification 
strategy and therefore provides causal evidence on the effects of dark trading.  Overcoming the 
endogeneity problem and obtaining sufficiently detailed data have been significant challenges for 
empirical studies of dark trading.  Second, the paper identifies a partition of dark trading that is 
theoretically and empirically important.  The results for the two dark trading types provide a 
possible reason why empirical studies of dark trading in different markets find different results; 
namely, the composition of dark trading, which determines its impact, varies across countries and 
markets.  Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2015) examine how the tick size influences dark trading 
and find that market participants use US dark pools to obtain a finer pricing grid when stock 
prices are constrained by the tick size, leading to increased fragmentation.  Along similar lines, 
Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2014) analyze how dark venues can be used for ‘queue 
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jumping’ ahead of displayed liquidity by trading at sub-penny increments.  Although they analyze 
only the subset of dark trading that is associated with queue jumping, their finding that non-
midquote dark trading is associated with improved market quality is consistent with our results.  
Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2015) study dark trading in a laboratory market.  In their setting, 
the ability to hide liquidity has a substantial impact on trader behavior and order submission 
strategies, but a modest effect on aggregate outcomes such as liquidity.  Ready (2014) analyzes 
the determinants of volume in two block crossing systems (Liquidnet and POSIT) and finds more 
dark trading in stocks with lower levels of adverse selection risks.  Degryse, de Jong, and van 
Kervel (2015) analyze 52 Dutch stocks and conclude that fragmentation of volume across visible 
order books improves consolidated liquidity, but dark trading has a detrimental effect.  Buti, 
Rindi, and Werner (2011) use data from 11 US dark pools and conclude that dark pool activity 
improves spreads, depth and short-term volatility.  Nimalendran and Ray (2014) examine data 
from one US dark pool and find informational linkages between lit and dark venues due to traders 
using algorithms to split orders across venues.  Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) find that in 
Australia low levels of dark trading can improve price discovery and decrease spreads, but when 
dark volume exceeds 10% of total trading, informational efficiency deteriorates. 
Our paper is also related to two studies of the minimum price improvement requirements 
for dark trades in Canada and Australia.  Foley and Putniņš (2014) show that in both countries, 
the minimum price improvement requirements substantially decreased the level of dark trading 
and increased average bid-ask spreads for stock market index constituents.  Their analysis 
suggests that the increase in spreads was larger for stocks that experienced more substitution from 
two-sided dark markets to one-sided midpoint dark crossing systems, consistent with our finding 
that two-sided dark trading benefits market quality.  Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park (2015) 
highlight the heterogeneity in how the Canadian minimum price improvement rules impacted 
dark pools and investor groups.  They show that for the most liquid cross-listed Canadian stocks 
there is no significant change in market quality around the regulation.  We confirm this finding 
and show that in a broader cross-section of stocks there is a significant change in market quality. 
In contrast to Foley and Putniņš (2014) and Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park (2015) 
who focus on the effects of minimum price improvement rules, we focus on understanding the 
causal effects of different types of dark trading.  The regulation in our paper primarily serves as 
one of the instrumental variables that facilitates identification of the effects of dark trading.  
Understanding the effects of dark trading has broader use in policymaking and market design than 
understanding the effects of a particular regulation.  For example, in addition to shedding light on 
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the effects of the regulation, our findings also: (i) can be used to predict the effects of other 
regulation or market structure changes that affect either of the two types of dark trading, (ii) 
explain why dark trading can have different effects in different countries or markets as a result of 
variation in the composition of dark trading types, (iii) validate recent theory and identify 
mechanisms that should be incorporated in theoretical models, and (iv) provide guidance on 
whether trends in dark trading through time and in the cross-section of stocks should be a concern 
to policymakers. 
Our results have a number of policy implications, in particular given that dark trading is 
high on the current agenda of many regulators.  Our results imply that dark trading should not be 
treated as a homogenous group; it is important to distinguish between different types of dark 
trading when developing policy.  The effects of aggregate dark trading depend on the 
composition of dark trading types within the aggregate.  The larger the proportion of two-sided 
dark trading the more likely aggregate dark trading benefits market quality.  A harmful level of 
dark trading in one country may not be harmful in another due to differences in the composition 
of dark trading types.  In designing regulation it is important to consider not only the regulation’s 
effect on the level of dark trading but also on the composition of dark trading types.  For example, 
the minimum price improvement rules in Canada and Australia decreased the amount of dark 
trading but also caused substitution from two-sided dark trading to one-sided midpoint dark 
trading.  Consequently, market-wide liquidity decreased after the regulation. 
Finally, our results have implications for tick size regulation, which is at the center of a 
US SEC Pilot Program.  The tick size has a number of effects on trader behavior and market 
quality; for recent evidence see O’Hara, Saar, and Zhong (2014), Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, 
and Werner (2015).  Our findings suggest that an additional channel by which the tick size affects 
market quality is its effect on the structure of dark trading.  Dark trading is more active in stocks 
when the spread is constrained by the tick size (Kwan, Masulis, and McInish, 2015).  Our results 
suggest that when dark trading is used as a way of obtaining a finer price grid it can benefit 
market quality as long as the price grid allows dark liquidity to concurrently exist on both the 
buy- and sell-sides of the market.  Minimum price improvement requirements can force dark 
trades to occur at the midpoint in the large number of stocks that are constrained by the tick size, 
and consequently force beneficial two-sided dark markets out of existence.  Our results suggest 
that minimum price improvement requirements can be improved by ensuring tick sizes do not 




2. Theory and hypotheses 
 Dark trading is a broad term that can include: (i) trading in dark pools (automated non-
transparent trading venues), (ii) non-transparent order types on lit exchanges that interact with lit 
order flow, and (iii) internalization of order flow by brokers acting as principals.  We focus on 
trading in dark pools and trading with non-transparent order types.
3
  Internalization of order flow 
is associated with issues in addition to transparency, such as cream-skimming (e.g., Easley, 
Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1996). 
 There is a great deal of variation in how dark trading occurs in different venues.  One 
partition of dark trading that is important both theoretically and empirically is whether dark trades 
execute (i) at a single price such as the midpoint of the NBBO, or (ii) at different prices on both 
the buy- and sell-sides of the market (e.g., at prices that are a fraction of a spread in from the 
NBBO).  We refer to these two types as ‘one-sided’ and ‘two-sided’ dark trading (or ‘midpoint’ 
and ‘fractional price improvement’ dark trading), respectively.
4
   
There are three important differences between these two types of dark trading.  The first 
is execution probability and its impact on order routing decisions and order flow spillovers 
between venues.  In a market with one-sided dark trading, at any point in time, dark liquidity 
(unexecuted ‘resting’ dark orders) can be available to buyers or to sellers depending on the order 
imbalance at the midquote, but not to both.  If there is a sell imbalance at the midquote, then only 
incoming buy orders can execute immediately against the resting dark orders, and incoming sell 
orders would either be placed in the queue at the midquote or re-routed to a two-sided market for 
immediate execution, depending on routing preferences.  The opposite is true if there is a buy 
imbalance.  In contrast, in a two-sided dark market, as long as there are resting dark orders on 
both sides, both buyers and sellers can instantly execute their trades against the resting dark 
liquidity.  Therefore, (assuming resting dark orders are present) an impatient buy or sell order 
(one that is willing to cross the spread) routed to a midpoint dark market at a random time has a 
probability around 50% of executing immediately, whereas if routed to a two-sided dark market, 
the probability is 100%.   
                                                          
3
 In contrast to the US, Europe and Australia, fair access rules in Canada and requirements for price 
improvement on internalized orders have hampered the development of automated ‘internalizers’. 
4
 Dark trading at a single price such as the midpoint of the NBBO or the volume-weighted average price 
(VWAP) is not uncommon.  Examples include dark pools such as ITG Posit, Liquidnet, ASX Centre Point, 
ITG MatchNow (after Oct. 2012), Instinet VWAP Cross, Turquoise Midpoint, and midpoint dark order 
types offered by exchanges such as the TSX, Chi-X, Nasdaq, BATS, and DirectEdge.  Similarly, two-sided 
dark trading is not uncommon in both dark pools and as non-transparent order types on lit exchanges.  
Examples include ITG MatchNow (before Oct. 2012), Alpha Intraspread (before Oct. 2012), Instinet CBX, 
Turquoise Integrated, Credit Suisse CrossFinder, Goldman Sachs Sigma X, Deutsche Bank Super X, Citi 
Match, and UBS PIN. 
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Impatient traders that are not able to obtain immediate execution in a one-sided dark 
venue will often route their orders to lit venues, thereby increasing imbalances in lit order flow.  
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) show that the increased order imbalances in the lit market can 
harm lit market liquidity.
 5
  This is because the one-sided midpoint venue executes some of the 
balanced order flow (which is a source of profits for lit liquidity providers), but none of the order 
imbalance (which imposes costs such as inventory holding costs and adverse selection costs).  Lit 
liquidity providers implicitly use the profits from executing balanced order flow to subsidize the 
costs of unbalanced order flow and therefore a decrease in the balanced flow requires a higher 
bid-ask spread for a liquidity provider to break even. 
The impact of the order flow spillovers from one-sided dark markets is even more 
important if we account for the tendency for some traders to cluster on one side of the market, 
i.e., correlation in order flow direction.  For example, informed traders buy when they have good 
news and sell when they have bad news.  If their information is correlated (or in the extreme case, 
identical) they will tend to buy at the same time and sell at the same time as other informed 
traders.  Therefore, an impatient informed buy order routed to a one-sided dark market is more 
likely to occur when there is a buy imbalance at the midquote than a sell imbalance, and thus has 
less than a 50% probability of immediate execution.  In contrast, the probability is around 50% 
for an uninformed order that is not correlated with other traders’ order flow.  The same holds for 
more patient orders that are willing to wait in the queue at the midquote if they are unable to 
immediately execute: informed orders will tend to be placed in longer queues than uninformed 
orders due to their correlation with other informed order flow.  Zhu (2014) shows this mechanism 
more formally; in his model, informed traders face lower execution probabilities in a one-sided 
dark market than uninformed traders. The consequence of the difference in execution 
probabilities is that the order imbalance that spills over into the lit market (after failing to 
immediately execute in the one-sided dark market, or due to choosing not to route to the one-
sided market) has a higher concentration of informed orders.  Therefore, one-sided dark trading 
can harm lit market liquidity through an increase in adverse selection risks (Zhu, 2014).  
                                                          
5
 Their model is cast as a dealer market that competes with a crossing network; however, the market 
structure is similar to a two-sided lit exchange that competes with a dark pool that executes trades at the 
midpoint of the lit market’s quotes.  Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) show that the introduction of a 
competing crossing network also has other effects such as attracting new uninformed order flow, which 




 Importantly, the tendency for dark trading to increase order imbalances in the lit market 
and thereby harm liquidity occurs for one-sided dark trading but not necessarily two-sided dark 
trading.  This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: One-sided (midpoint) dark trading harms market liquidity. 
 
The second important difference between one-sided and two-sided dark trading is the 
extent to which they conceal the trading intentions of patient (liquidity-supplying) orders.  One-
sided dark trading reveals more information about trading intentions than two-sided dark trading.  
For example, in a one-sided dark market, market participants know the direction of the order 
imbalance at the midquote if they have a resting order at the midquote that has not yet executed 
(the imbalance must be in the direction of that order) or if they have recently had an order 
immediately filled at the midquote (the imbalance must be in the opposite direction to that order).  
It is also possible for traders to infer the direction of the midquote imbalance by submitting 
probing orders at the midquote and observing whether they immediately execute or not.  The 
direction of the imbalance is informative about the trading intentions of others and reveals some 
private information.  In contrast, a two-sided dark market can have dark liquidity posted on both 
the buy- and sell-sides, with no information about the quantities available on either side.  In such 
a situation (assuming liquidity is posted on both sides) it is not possible to infer whether there is 
an overall buy or sell imbalance by observing when one’s orders execute or using probing trades.  
Informed traders, who are concerned about revealing their trading intentions, are therefore likely 
to be more willing to provide liquidity in a two-sided dark market than in a one-sided market. 
Third, dark liquidity provision can be profitable in a two-sided dark market because a 
liquidity provider can earn a non-zero spread in the dark.  In contrast, there is zero spread in a 
one-sided dark market by construction and therefore there is little incentive for market 
participants to act as dark liquidity providers without an alternative reason for wanting to trade. 
A number of theoretical studies predict that less pre-trade transparency in a limit order 
market encourages more aggressive competition in liquidity provision, in particular among 
informed traders.  For example, Boulatov and George (2013) show that liquidity and price 
discovery are better in a dark limit order market than in a transparent one.  With pre-trade 
transparency, informed traders that submit limit orders earn a profit from providing liquidity, but 
in doing so they give away some of their private information to other traders that observe the 
limit orders before submitting market orders.  Without pre-trade transparency, informed traders 
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can profit from providing liquidity without giving away their trading intentions because dark limit 
orders are not displayed.  Therefore, a larger proportion of informed traders compete to provide 
liquidity, which makes the market more liquid.  Informed traders that supply liquidity do so more 
aggressively than those that demand liquidity, which increases informational efficiency.   
Although Boulatov and George (2013) do not model side-by-side trading in a dark and lit 
venue, the mechanisms they identify are relevant for understanding the impact of dark pools.  
Informed traders can compete in liquidity provision more aggressively in two-sided dark pools 
because they can do so without revealing their trading intentions.  Thus, informed liquidity 
providers in the dark can undercut the spreads offered in the lit market.  The increased 
aggressiveness of informed trading can help price discovery.  It can also improve liquidity in the 
lit market by forcing lit liquidity providers to compete with the dark liquidity.  Importantly, this 
mechanism only applies to two-sided dark trading because (i) dark liquidity provision can be 
profitable because of the positive bid-ask spread in the dark, and (ii) informed traders do not 
reveal their information by posting dark liquidity in a two-sided dark market.
6
  This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Two-sided dark trading improves market liquidity. 
 
 Two-sided dark trading can also benefit liquidity by increasing the number of liquidity 
providers when liquidity fragments across multiple venues (e.g., Biais, Martimort, and Rochet, 
2000).  Dark trading allows traders to bypass time priority in a lit limit order book.  Foucault and 
Menkveld (2008) show that such ‘queue jumping’ can encourage competition in liquidity 
provision and compete away profits on inframarginal limit orders, thereby increasing liquidity.  
Finally, dark trading can benefit liquidity by allowing liquidity providers to compete on a finer 
pricing grid (e.g., Biais, Bisiere, and Spatt, 2010; Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner, 
2014).  Most of the mechanisms by which dark trading can have a positive impact on liquidity 
occur when dark trading is two-sided and thus provide added support for Hypothesis 2.   
                                                          
6
 Models of liquidity supply/demand decisions in different settings also find that reduced pre-trade 
transparency can benefit liquidity.  For example, Rindi (2008) models the effects of pre-trade transparency 
of trader identities.  Informed traders are effective liquidity suppliers, as they face little or no adverse 
selection costs.  When information acquisition is endogenous and costly, transparency reduces the number 
of informed traders, which harms liquidity.  Buti and Rindi (2013) model the use of iceberg orders, in 
which only a portion of the limit order is displayed and the remainder is hidden.  They find that iceberg 
orders encourage traders to compete in liquidity provision and therefore increase gains from trade. 
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Because theory predicts that different types of dark trading can have different effects on 
market quality, the impact of aggregate dark trading (aggregating across different types) depends 
on the composition of dark trading types within the aggregate.  This leads to a third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of aggregate dark trading depends on the composition of 
dark trading types within the aggregate.  Dark trading is more likely to have a 
positive effect on liquidity the higher the level of two-sided dark trading relative 
to one-sided dark trading. 
 
3. Institutional setting and the natural experiment 
 Our main analysis focusses on dark trading in Canada and therefore this section describes 
the Canadian institutional setting.  We describe the differences in the Australian institutional 
setting when we turn to the analysis of the Australian data. 
 
3.1. Trading venues and order types 
Canada, like many other countries, has experienced rapid fragmentation of its trading 
landscape during the last decade.  In addition to the main listing exchange, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX), at the time of our sample there are five Alternative Trading Systems on which 
trading occurs with pre-trade transparency (‘lit’ venues): Alpha, Chi-X, Pure Trading, TMX-
Select, and Omega.
7
 TSX is still the dominant market, executing approximately 61% of Canadian 
dollar volume during the sample period, followed by Alpha (15%) and Chi-X (13%).  
Additionally, there are four continuous auction venues in which orders can be submitted without 
pre-trade transparency: ITG’s MatchNow, Alpha Intraspread, Chi-X and TSX.
8
  MatchNow and 
Alpha Intraspread are dark pools because only dark orders can be submitted to these venues and 
therefore dark orders execute exclusively against other dark orders. They account for 
approximately 3.0% and 2.5% of Canadian dollar volume, respectively, during our sample period.   
In contrast, Chi-X and TSX allow dark orders in addition to lit orders and the two types of orders 
interact and can execute against one another.  Following the introduction of the minimum price 
improvement rules in 2012, Alpha Intraspread (which had been a stand-alone continuous dark 
pool) was merged with the Alpha lit exchange.  Subsequently, Intraspread orders are able to 
                                                          
7
 A sixth alternative trading system (Chi-X 2) was added in April 2013, after our sample period. 
8
 MatchNow was launched in July 2007.  Intraspread was launched in May 2011.  Chi-X introduced dark 
midpoint orders in February 2008.  TSX introduced dark orders between April and May 2011. 
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interact with both lit and dark liquidity, similar to the TSX and Chi-X.  Table 1 provides a 
summary of the market shares, order types, and other characteristics of Canadian trading venues.  
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
Prior to October 15, 2012, all dark orders in Canada were required to provide some price 
improvement, resulting in dark executions within the NBBO spread.  The required amount of 
price improvement, however, was not specified legislatively.  MatchNow and Intraspread both 
offered two types of price improvement: midpoint (i.e., 50% improvement over the NBBO) and 
20% (on MatchNow) or 10% (on Intraspread) fractional improvement over the NBBO.  Price 
improvement of 10%, for example, means that if a stock has a national best bid of $10.05 and a 
national best offer of $10.06, a passive dark buy order could be placed at a price of $10.051 (an 
improvement of 10% of the NBBO spread) and a passive dark sell order could be placed at a 
price of $10.059 (also an improvement of 10% of the NBBO spread).  Midpoint orders facilitate 
one-sided dark trading, whereas venues that accommodate ‘fractional’ price improvement (e.g., 
10% and 20%) facilitate two-sided dark trading.  The use of order routing algorithms is common 
during our sample period and results in virtual consolidation of the multiple trading venues.  A 
routing algorithm might seek to execute an impatient order in a particular venue (e.g., a dark 
midpoint venue) and if it fails to obtain execution, then re-route the order to a different venue.  




In addition to the continuous dark pools, systems to negotiate block trades without pre-
trade transparency have existed for decades.  The two that operate during our sample are 
Liquidnet and Instinet.
10
  While these systems also have limited or no pre-trade transparency, they 
differ from dark pools that have captured significant market share in recent years in that they are 
generally only used by large institutional traders, are non-continuous, and only offer services for 
block trades.  The combined market share of Liquidnet and Instinet in Canadian equities during 
the third quarter of 2012 was only 0.2%.
11
  Brokers are also able to internalize orders off-market.  
                                                          
9
 The Internet Appendix is available at http://goo.gl/NY4svm 
10
 These venues provide ‘trade blotter’ services that facilitate the execution of ‘upstairs’ trades.  Typically, 
clients enter their desire to trade large blocks into the system.  The system then identifies whether any 
potential counterparties exist, and if so, allows the counterparties to negotiate the trade anonymously.   
11
 This statistic is taken from the IIROC Marketplace Statistics Report available at www.iiroc.ca. 
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However, the order exposure rule together with the fair access regulations have hampered the 
development of automated ‘internalizers’ such as those in the US, Australia and elsewhere.
12
 
Although dark trading in Canada shares many similarities with the US, there are four key 
differences.  First, fair access regulations require dark venues in Canada to allow access to all 
brokers; in contrast, many dark pools in the US have exclusive access (e.g., Boni, Brown, and 
Leach, 2013).  Second, internalized orders in Canada must provide price improvement over the 
best lit NBBO price of at least one cent.  Third, odd-lots are not able to be traded in the dark 
during our sample period, significantly increasing the cost of ‘pinging’ the dark with a small 
probing order.  Fourth, most Canadian marketplaces have broker preferencing, which allows 
passive (lit or dark) orders to break time priority to execute with an incoming active order from 
the same broker. 
 
3.2. Regulation of dark trading 
The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) sets and enforces 
the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR), which govern trading on debt and equity 
marketplaces in Canada.  On April 13, 2012, IIROC notice 12-0130 announced changes to the 
UMIR, which became effective on October 15, 2012.  These changes imposed a minimum price 
improvement by dark orders of one full tick relative to the prevailing NBBO, except when the 
spread is already constrained to one tick, in which case dark orders are allowed at the midpoint of 
the NBBO (half a tick price improvement).  This new requirement provides an exemption for 
dark orders larger than either 50 standard trading units (STU), which is usually 5,000 shares, or 
$100,000.
13
  Such large dark orders are able to execute at the NBBO, without providing any price 
improvement, as long as they give priority to lit orders at the same price on the same trading 
venue.  Prior to the change in regulation, dark orders were required to provide a “better price” 
than the prevailing NBBO but with no minimum increment of price improvement.
14
  
The minimum price improvement requirements caused a significant decline in dark 
volume, and a change in the mix of one-sided versus two-sided dark trading.  Fig. 1 shows the 
significant decrease in dark volume as a result of the change in regulation.  The level of dark 
trading fell from approximately 8.5% of dollar volume during the two months preceding the 
regulatory change to approximately 5.3% in the two months after the change—a decrease of over 
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 See the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) Section 6.3. 
13
 A standard trading unit is 100 shares for stocks priced above $1.00, 1,000 shares for stocks priced 
between $0.10 and $1.00, and 10,000 shares for stocks priced below $0.10. 
14
 The UMIR defined “better price” simply as a lower price than the best ask price in the case of a purchase 
and higher price than the best bid price in the case of a sale. 
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one third.  The reduction in dark trading occurred very quickly and distinctly around the change 
in regulation. 
< Fig. 1 here > 
 
Fig. 2 shows that prior to the introduction of the minimum price improvement 
requirements approximately 60% of dark trades were executed in two-sided markets (at fractional 
price increments of 10% or 20% of the NBBO spread), while the remaining 40% executed at the 
midquote.  Under the new regulation, two-sided dark trading effectively disappeared and almost 
all dark trading now takes place at the midpoint of the NBBO (99.8% of all dark trades).  
Although large dark orders are allowed to execute at the NBBO after giving priority to lit orders, 
such dark orders are rare and account for a negligible fraction of dark trades.   
 
< Fig. 2 here > 
 
4. Data and metrics 
Our analysis of dark trading in Canada uses the constituents of the TSX Composite 
Index, which comprises approximately 250 of the most actively traded Canadian listed securities, 
for a period of two months before and two months after the introduction of the minimum price 
improvement rules (August 15, 2012 – December 15, 2012).
15
  The four-month period is chosen 
as a compromise considering the following tradeoff.  If the window is too narrow, the analysis 
will lack statistical power and will not adequately capture changes in market participants’ trading 
behavior.
16
  But, if the window is too wide, the analysis around the regulation is likely to be 
influenced by confounding factors that are unrelated to dark trading.  Although we control for 
confounding factors using a matched sample of US stocks, the longer the window, the less precise 
the matches and controls. 
                                                          
15
 We remove trading days in which the US markets were closed (during US Thanksgiving and Hurricane 
Sandy), so that the sample is consistent across all analyses including those that use US data.  We obtain 
data on shares outstanding, stock splits, index constituents and cross-listed securities from the monthly 
TSX e-Review publications.  We restrict our sample to stocks that are included in the TSX Composite 
Index at both the start and end of our sample period to avoid effects arising from index inclusion/deletion.  
This results in 246 Canadian stocks.  To avoid problems associated with differing Standard Trading Units 
and tick sizes we omit stocks with a price less than $1.  This criterion removes five stocks, leaving a final 
sample of 242 stocks.  Stocks outside of the TSX Composite Index tend to have very low levels of dark 
trading and thus would not contribute much to our analysis of the effects of dark trading.  Our results are 
also robust to using only the stocks that are cross-listed in the US. 
16
 As illustrated in Fig. 1, the regulation impacted the amount of dark trading effectively overnight, with no 
evidence of a gradual adjustment process.  Therefore, the four month window is likely to be sufficiently 
long to capture changes in market participants’ behavior.  
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We combine tick-by-tick data on lit and dark trades from a number of sources.  We 
obtain proprietary data on all dark trades executed on MatchNow, Intraspread, Chi-X, Alpha and 
TSX
17
 directly from the trading venues.
18
  The data on dark trades includes the stock ticker, date, 
time, price and volume.  We are unable to obtain data on dark block trades negotiated on 
Liquidnet/Instinet.
19
  We also obtain data on all lit trades and the best quotes for all Canadian lit 
marketplaces (Alpha, Omega, TSX, TMX Select, Pure and Chi-X) from the Thomson Reuters 
Tick History database.  Lit trades contain information on the stock ticker, date, time, price and 
volume, and the quotes comprise the best bid and best ask quote at every point in time for every 
venue.  Timestamps on trades and quotes are recorded to the millisecond.  We consolidate the 
best bid and ask quotes across all lit Canadian venues at every point in time to obtain the NBBO.  
To control for changes in market characteristics that are driven by factors other than dark 
trading, we obtain similar trade-level data (from the Thomson Reuters Tick History database) for 
a matched sample of US stocks, consolidating trades and quotes from all US exchanges.  Each 
Canadian stock is matched to a US stock listed on either NASDAQ or NYSE.  Matched stocks 
are chosen in a manner similar to Huang and Stoll (1996) as those that minimize the sum of 
squared relative differences in market capitalization and trading volume, 𝑋𝑗, during the two 
months prior to the price improvement rules (August 15 – October 15, 2012):  










𝑗=1 .                                        (1) 
The superscript C indexes Canadian stocks, while the superscript U indexes US-listed stocks.
20
 
For robustness, we also examine a second matched group.  Exploiting the fact that most 
of the stocks in the TSX Composite Index are cross-listed in the US, we take the US side of the 
cross-listed stocks as a natural control group.  The advantage of this approach is that, by 
construction, it provides a perfect control for stock characteristics.  The weakness is that trading 
in the US side of the cross-listed stocks might not be entirely exogenous with respect to the 
minimum price improvement regulation due to cross-market arbitrage and the possibility of order 
flow migration to the US.  The results using the two different groups of matched stocks are quite 
similar (the latter are reported as part of our robustness tests). 
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 Copyright TSX Inc., all rights reserved. Not to be reproduced or redistributed. TSX Inc. disclaims all 
representations and warranties with respect to this information, and shall not be liable to any person for any 
use of this information.  
18
 The proprietary data consists only of information that was publically reported to the consolidated tape.  
19
 IIROC Marketplace Statistics indicate that in the third quarter of 2012 Liquidnet and Instinet combined 
accounted for only 0.2% of total Canadian dollar volume.  
20
 The median differences between the Canadian and matched US stocks’ market capitalization and average 
traded dollar volume are less than 15%, suggesting the matching is relatively precise. 
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 All liquidity and informational efficiency metrics are calculated for each stock-day using 
intraday trade and quote data.  Details are in Appendix A.  We measure liquidity using quoted, 
effective and realized spreads, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity metric, and depth.  Quoted spreads are 
time-weighted and measure the cost of immediately executing a small round trip trade at the best 
lit quotes.  Effective spreads reflect the cost of a transaction, accounting for the fact that trades 
can execute at prices within the best lit quotes.  Realized spreads reflect the proportion of the 
transaction cost that is earned by the liquidity provider after removing the adverse selection cost.  
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity metric is a measure of price impact scaled by traded dollar volume, 
and therefore captures depth and resiliency.  Depth is measured as the log of the time-weighted 
average quoted dollar depth available to be bought and sold at the NBBO on all lit venues.  
Following the empirical literature, we use four high-frequency measures of the 
informational efficiency of prices: absolute autocorrelations of midquote returns, midquote 
variance ratios, high-frequency standard deviations, and measures of short-term return 
predictability using lagged market returns.
21
  The informational efficiency metrics, to varying 
degrees, measure inefficiency with respect to transitory deviations in price (possibly caused by 
order imbalances and imperfect liquidity), as well as inefficiency around permanent changes in 
prices (possibly caused by delay in impounding new information and under/over reactions to 
news).  Thus, the informational inefficiency measures are likely to be impacted by liquidity, but 
also capture an informational component that is orthogonal to liquidity.  In support of this 
conjecture, Rösch, Subrahmanyam, and van Dijk (2013) provide evidence that informational 
efficiency metrics measured at intraday horizons are highly correlated with low-frequency 
measures of informational efficiency, and are different from liquidity measures.  All four 
informational inefficiency measures are scaled so that they range from zero (indicating high 
levels of efficiency) to 100 (indicating low levels of efficiency). 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 The core of our analysis uses the introduction of restrictions on dark trading as a natural 
experiment and source of exogenous variation to identify the causal effects of dark trading.  Our 
main analysis, reported in the next three Subsections (5.1-5.3), focuses on the effects of dark 
trading in Canada, while the fourth Subsection (5.4) reports Australian results and compares them 
to those of Canada. 
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 Autocorrelations are used in Hendershott and Jones (2005) and Anderson, Eom, Hahn, and Park (2013), 
variance ratios are popularized by Lo and MacKinlay (1988), high-frequency volatility is used by O’Hara 
and Ye (2011), and return predictability using lagged market returns follows Hou and Moskowitz (2005). 
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Our main analysis starts with simple univariate pre/post comparisons of mean market 
characteristics.  These show that spreads are wider and informational efficiency is lower after the 
regulation, consistent with the notion that dark trading can be beneficial to market quality.  Next, 
we turn to one-stage least squares (OLS) panel regressions of market quality metrics on dark 
trading and control variables.  Although much of the variation in dark trading is around the 
exogenous introduction of restrictions on dark trading, the OLS regressions do not address the 
potential endogeneity of dark trading and are thus reported only in the Internet Appendix for 
completeness (the results from the OLS concur with our main conclusions).  Our main 
conclusions are drawn from instrumental variables regressions, exploiting the minimum price 
improvement regulation as the main instrumental variable.  We first examine the effects of dark 
trading in aggregate, before partitioning dark trading into two types.  We control for trends in 
market quality in a matched sample of US stocks, effectively giving a difference-in-differences 
estimate.  All of these analyses, from the univariate pre/post comparisons to the instrumental 
variables regressions and an extensive set of robustness tests (spread across the paper and the 
Internet Appendix) point to the same conclusions—dark trading in our sample benefits market 




5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on trading activity in Canada before and after the 
minimum price improvement regulation came into effect.  Consistent with Fig. 1, the level of 
dark trading is considerably lower after the minimum price improvement rules come into effect.  
The mean (median) percentage of daily dollar volume executed in the dark falls from 9.01% 
(7.58%) to 5.93% (4.05%) after the regulation.  Lit and dark trades tend to have a similar size 
(mean of approximately $6,200 and median of approximately $4,600) and their size does not 
change noticeably after introducing the minimum price improvement rules.  While the total 
amount of dark trading is reduced from an average of $492 million per day to $321 million per 
day, this is somewhat offset by a small increase in median lit trading.  Average total daily traded 
dollar volume remains unchanged at approximately $6.2 billion per day.  
 
< Table 2 here > 
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 The Internet Appendix is available at http://goo.gl/NY4svm. 
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To get a sense of the variation in Canadian dark trading, Fig. 3 Panel A presents the 
pooled sample histogram of stock-day level dark trading as a fraction of total stock-day dollar 
volume, 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡.  Approximately 9% of stock-days have no dark trading at all.  Around 40% of 
stock-days have between 1% and 5% of their dollar volume executed in the dark.  There are very 
few stock days with greater than 20% dark trading, and only 28 stock-days have dark trading in 
excess of 50% of total dollar volume.  Panel B shows the distribution of changes in the dark 
trading around the regulation (the distribution of the average 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 before the regulation minus 
the average after the regulation).  The distribution shows that for a typical stock, the level of dark 
trading decreases by around 3%, but there is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of the 
regulation—approximately 10% of stocks experience an increase in the level of dark trading after 
the regulation.  
 
< Fig. 3 here > 
 
 Fig. 4 reports the distributions of changes in dark trading, by dark trading type.  
Consistent with Fig. 2, Panel A shows that almost all Canadian stocks experience a decrease in 
two-sided dark trading (the exception is the 3% of stocks that have no change), with the typical 
decrease being around 3%.  Panel B shows that in contrast, there is greater heterogeneity in the 
impact of the regulation on one-sided dark trading.  Many stocks experience an increase in the 
amount of one-sided (midpoint) dark trading, with a typical increase being 1-2%.  
 
< Fig. 4 here > 
 
 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the stock-day market quality metrics and control 
variables for Canada.  Before the regulation, quoted spreads have a mean and median of 12.69 
bps and 9.66 bps; effective spreads are slightly lower with a mean of 10.44 bps due to some 
trades executing within the spread; and realized spreads are even smaller with a mean of 2.29 bps 
due to the fact that trades tend to have positive price impact on average.  All three spreads 
increase after the regulation, by between 0.56 and 1.21 bps on average, and the differences are 
statistically distinguishable from zero, using standard errors clustered by stock and date.  
Similarly, 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 increases and depth decreases a statistically significant amount after the 
regulation.  The four informational inefficiency metrics also show a deterioration in market 
quality after the regulation.  The variable 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 indicates that quoted spreads tend to be 
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constrained to the minimum of one tick approximately 59% of the time for an average stock.  The 
median company has a market value of approximately $2.3 billion.  
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
5.2. Instrumental variables regressions for aggregate dark trading 
One of the main challenges in empirically studying the impact of dark trading on market 
quality is the endogeneity of dark trading with respect to market conditions.  For example, dark 
trading tends to increase when spreads are constrained to the minimum tick size because dark 
trades are allowed to occur within the spread at sub-penny price increments (Kwan, Masulis, and 
McInish, 2015).  Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) find that dark pool activity is higher when limit 
order depth is high, spreads are narrow and tick sizes are large.  They argue that the conditional 
nature of the decision to execute in the dark results in an endogeneity issue between market 
quality and dark trading.   
To overcome the endogeneity issue we use the introduction of the minimum price 
improvement rule as an instrumental variable for dark trading in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
framework, controlling for confounding effects with a set of matched US stocks.  The first stage 
is a regression of the level of dark trading (𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡, the fraction of dollar volume in stock 𝑖 on day 
𝑡 that is traded in the dark) on the instrumental variables and a set of control variables.  The main 
instrumental variable is a dummy variable for the minimum price improvement rule (𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 
after the rule change and 0 before).  This instrument alone is sufficient for identification.  
However, as an additional instrument, we also include the lagged level of dark trading 
(𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1).
23
  It is not uncommon to include lagged endogenous variables as instruments in a 
microstructure setting (e.g., Sarkar and Schwartz, 2009).  The first-stage regression is: 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,                        (2)  
where 𝛼𝑖 is a set of stock fixed effects, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 comprises the following five control 
variables.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 takes the value zero on the first day in the sample and increments by one every 
subsequent day.  It removes general time-series trends in dark trading and in market quality.  
𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 is the daily mean of the corresponding market quality metric (the second-stage 
dependent variable) for the matched US stocks. Consequently, we estimate a different first-stage 
model for each market quality metric. The inclusion of 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 in the second stage removes 
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 In robustness tests (reported later in this section) we show that a simple model using just 𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡as an 
instrumental variable produces similar results to our baseline model. 
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variation in market quality that is common to the US and Canada and is driven by factors other 
than dark trading, thereby giving a difference-in-differences estimate (more on this below).  The 
other control variables are $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 (the natural log of traded dollar volume), 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 (the 
stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote), and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
(the percentage of the trading day for which the stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at one 
tick).
24
  In our main results we estimate the first-stage Eq. (2) on the pooled sample of stock-days.  
Robustness tests indicate that estimating the first stage separately for each stock produces similar 
results in the second stage, as does including/omitting stock fixed effects in the first stage. 
Table 4 reports the results from the first stage of the 2SLS for Canada.  Although the first 
stage is different for each of the market quality metrics (due to 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡), the results are fairly 
similar across the market quality metrics. Therefore, Table 4 reports results from only quoted 
spread.  The estimates indicate that the minimum price improvement regulation is associated with 
a decline in the average level of dark trading by approximately 3.1%, holding other factors fixed, 
and the decline is highly statistically significant.  The F-statistics in our first-stage regression with 
and without stock fixed effects (826–1,312) are above both this level and the critical values 
specified by Stock and Yogo (2005), allowing us to reject the null of a weak instrument.
25
  There 
is a strong negative relation between 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 and $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 and the relation becomes stronger 
with the addition of stock fixed effects.  This result is contrary to the finding of Buti, Rindi, and 
Werner (2011) that, in the US, dark pool activity is positively related to liquidity in the cross-
section.
26
  A possible explanation is that in our sample, there is considerably more variation in 
total dollar volume (the denominator of 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡) than in dark dollar volume (the numerator of 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡) so that when $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is high, 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 is low and vice versa.  To ensure our results are 
not driven predominantly by variation in $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡, we conduct two robustness tests.  The first 
is excluding $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 from the first-stage regressions (keeping it as a control variable in the 
second stage).  The second is using dark dollar volume that is not scaled by total dollar volume.  
The results (reported in the Internet Appendix) indicate that our findings are robust to these 
alternative specifications. 
  
< Table 4 here > 
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 Our results are robust to excluding the variable 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 from the first and second stages. 
25
 The large F-statistics are a result of the highly significant reduction in dark trading around the regulation 
and the strong persistence in dark trading from one day to the next, as well as the relatively large sample 
size. 
26
 Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) measure dark pool activity in a similar manner to this paper, i.e., dark 




The second-stage regressions estimate the impact of dark trading on a number of liquidity 
and informational efficiency measures:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 ,  (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a market quality metric for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is a set of stock fixed effects, and 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂   is the fitted level of dark trading.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 includes the same control variables as in 
the first stage, including the US daily mean of the corresponding market quality metric, 
𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡.  With the inclusion of 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡, our second-stage model produces a difference-in-
differences estimate, but with two distinct advantages over a ‘standard’ form of such a model.
27
  
First, by having a free coefficient on the variable 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡, it does not impose a one-to-one 
correspondence between changes in US market quality and changes in Canadian market quality.  
Instead, the degree of co-movement in market quality in the two markets is estimated from the 
data.  Therefore, the model is better able to account for the fact that the scale of the market 
quality variables differ between the US and Canada.  Second, by summarizing the control market 
(US) with a single time-series (rather than a collection of control stocks), the model avoids 
inflating the number of observations and thus provides more conservative standard errors.   
Table 5 reports second-stage estimates of the impact of dark trading on liquidity in 
Canada.  The results indicate that dark trading has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
all of the spread measures as well as Amihud’s illiquidity metric, suggesting that aggregate dark 
trading in Canada benefits liquidity.  The effect of dark trading on depth is not statistically 
different from zero.  A small increase in dark trading by 5% of total dollar volume is expected to 
decrease average quoted spreads by approximately 0.20 bps (0.05×(–3.98)), decrease effective 
spreads by 0.69 bps, and decrease realized spreads by 0.70 bps.  These decreases for just a small 
change in dark trading are economically meaningful compared to the means of quoted, effective 
and realized spreads: 12.86 bps, 10.75 bps, and 2.81 bps, respectively.   
An alternative way to interpret the magnitude of the effects is in terms of pooled standard 
deviations.  A one-standard-deviation increase in dark trading (6.4% of total dollar volume) is 
expected to decrease quoted spreads by 0.25 bps or 0.02 standard deviations (0.064×(–
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 More specifically, ignoring the control variables for simplicity, a standard difference-in-differences 
model, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 𝐷𝑖
𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴 + 𝜃 𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖
𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇+ 𝑖𝑡 gives an estimate of ?̂? = (𝑦𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −
𝑦𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴,𝑃𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) − (𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑃𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅).  By comparison, our second stage model produces an estimator that 
is essentially equivalent to ?̂? = (𝑦𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑦𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐷𝐴,𝑃𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) − 𝛾(𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑦𝑈𝑆,𝑃𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅), where 𝛾 is the 
coefficient of 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 and measures the extent to which the market quality characteristic 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 tends to co-
move in US and Canadian stocks. 
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3.98)/12.8), decrease effective spreads by 0.88 bps or 0.08 standard deviations, decrease realized 
spreads by 0.89 bps or 0.32 standard deviations, and decrease price impacts (Amihud’s 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡) 
by 0.02 standard deviations.  Therefore, while there is variation in the magnitudes across the 
different liquidity measures, the results suggest that aggregate dark trading in our sample has 
economically meaningful benefits to liquidity. 
 
< Table 5 here > 
 
The findings in Table 5 support our third hypothesis about the level and composition of 
dark trading.  As Fig. 2 illustrates, prior to the introduction of the minimum price improvement 
regulation, the majority of dark trading in Canada (approximately 60%) was two-sided.  The 
literature suggests that two-sided dark trading benefits liquidity (Hypothesis 2) and therefore a 
reduction in the aggregate level of Canadian dark trading is expected to decrease liquidity.  The 
minimum price improvement regulation not only changed the aggregate level of dark trading but 
also the composition, significantly increasing the level of one-sided (midpoint) dark trading and 
decreasing two-sided dark trading.  Because one-sided (two-sided) dark trading is expected to 
harm (benefit) liquidity, Hypothesis 3 suggests that this change in the composition is expected to 
reinforce the effect of the decrease in the aggregate level.  Therefore, the results support the 
notion that the composition of dark trading types within the aggregate affects market quality, and 
that dark trading can benefit liquidity when a large proportion of it is two-sided, resembling a 
dark limit order book. 
Coefficients on the time trend suggest that spreads become wider through the course of 
our sample period, not counting the effects of the regulation and holding other variables including 
US trends constant.  The coefficients on 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 are all positive and statistically significant 
(with the exception of the variance ratio, effective and realized spreads), indicating that liquidity 
in Canadian stocks tends to co-move with liquidity in US stocks.  Most coefficients on the control 
variables are consistent with our expectations—liquidity tends to be higher for days with greater 
volume and lower volatility.  The adjusted R
2
 of the regressions, which do not include the 
variation explained by the stock fixed effects, range between 2% and 30% suggesting that there 
are many factors beyond the variables included in our model that influence liquidity.  
The evidence in Table 5 indicates that dark trading in our sample has overall benefits for 
liquidity.  The minimum price improvement regulation decreased the level of dark trading and 
consequently increased average spreads (this is seen in Table 3).  However, the regulation also 
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increased the amount of price improvement received by the active side of dark trades.  In fact, the 
total dollar amount of price improvement received by the active side of all dark trades in our 
sample increases from approximately $60,000 per day before the regulation to $73,000 per day 
after the regulation, despite the decline in the amount of dark trading.  With wider spreads and 
worse liquidity in the lit market but more price improvement for dark trades, it is natural to ask 
whether market execution quality overall improves or deteriorates after the regulation.  To answer 
this question, we compare the increase in the dollar amount of price improvement for dark trades 
to the dollar value of the deterioration in lit spreads.  The spread costs for all lit trades (dollar 
value of effective half-spreads for the active side of all lit trades) increase from an average of 
$2,009,000 per day before the regulation to $2,381,000 after.  The $13,000 per day in additional 
price improvement for the active side of dark trades is negligible compared to the $372,000 per 
day increase in lit market execution costs.  So while the active side of dark trades gets better 
execution on average after the regulation, that improvement is not nearly enough to compensate 
for the overall deterioration in lit liquidity. 
 
< Table 6 here > 
 
Turning to the informational efficiency proxies, Table 6 reports second-stage regression 
estimates of the impact of dark trading in Canada.  The results suggest that dark trading reduces 
the level of all informational inefficiency metrics: absolute autocorrelations, variance ratios, high-
frequency volatility, and delay in reflecting market-wide information (although the effect on 
delay is not statistically significant).  These results suggest that, similar to its effects on liquidity, 
aggregate dark trading in Canada benefits informational efficiency.  Because the units of the 
informational efficiency proxies do not have a natural interpretation we examine the magnitude of 
the effects in terms of standard deviations.  A one-standard-deviation increase in dark trading 
(6.4% of total dollar volume) is expected to decrease absolute midquote return autocorrelations 
by 0.07 standard deviations (0.064×(–0.06)/0.05), decrease the variance ratio by 0.07 standard 
deviations, and decrease high-frequency volatility by 0.03 standard deviations, after controlling 
for other market characteristics and stock fixed effects.  While there is variation in the magnitudes 
across the different informational efficiency measures, the results suggest that aggregate dark 
trading in our sample has economically meaningful benefits for informational efficiency. 
The beneficial impact of aggregate dark trading on informational efficiency is consistent 
with the close relationship between liquidity and informational efficiency (e.g., Chordia, Roll, 
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and Subrahmanyam, 2008).  Similar to the liquidity result, the positive effect of aggregate dark 
trading on informational efficiency is likely to be driven by two-sided dark trading.  The model 
analyzed by Boulatov and George (2013) suggests that the ability to submit dark limit orders not 
only increases liquidity provision by informed traders but also the aggressiveness with which they 
trade, which in turn improves informational efficiency. 
We test the robustness of our results to a variety of alternative specifications of the 
instrumental variables regressions and different subsamples.  To concisely summarize the results 
of these tests Table 7 reports the t-statistics for the coefficient on the key independent variable, 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ , in the second-stage regressions.  The rows of Table 7 correspond to different dependent 
variables and the columns correspond to different specifications and subsamples.  Specification 
(1) is the base case specification (as reported in Tables 5 and 6, corresponding to Eq. (3)), which 
includes all of the control variables and stock fixed effects.  Specification (2) is a simpler 
instrumental variables model, which uses only the regulation dummy variable as an instrument 
(omitting lagged dark trading).  Other than the reduced instrument set, the control variables, 
sample and model structure is identical to specification (1).  Specification (3) is identical to the 
base case (1) except that the sample is constrained to cross-listed securities only.
28
  Specification 
(4) is identical to the base case (1) except that the first-stage regression is estimated on each stock 
separately allowing for heterogeneity across stocks in the way in which dark trading is affected 
by the minimum price improvement rules.  Specification (5) is identical to the base case (1) 
except that it omits two weeks either side of the introduction of the minimum price improvement 
rules to allow for transitory effects and adjustment in trading behavior.  In specification (6), rather 
than matching each Canadian stock to a different US stock, we use the US side of cross-listed 
stocks as the control group.  Specifications (7) and (8) are estimated on the largest 121 stocks and 
smallest 120 stocks, respectively, using the same variables as in specification (1).  Specification 
(9) is identical to specification (1) except that the two stages are estimated simultaneously using 
maximum likelihood.  Specifications (10) and (11) are estimated on the 68 stocks that are 
constrained by the tick size at least 90% of the time pre-regulation, and the 174 stocks that are 
constrained less than 90% of the time, respectively.  Additional robustness tests reported in the 
Internet Appendix show that our results are robust to alternative measurement frequencies for the 
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 Here, we include stocks that are cross-listed on any other market outside of Canada.  In the Internet 
Appendix we show that our results are also robust to using only stocks that are cross-listed on a US 
exchange.  The robustness of the results to using the subsample of cross-listed stocks indicates that our 
results are not driven by the repeal of the short sale price restrictions (which occurred at the same time as 
the minimum price improvement requirements) because cross-listed stocks experienced no change with 
respect to these rules. 
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informational efficiency metrics, using simple one-stage OLS regressions, excluding $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 
from the first stage, and using dark dollar volume that is not scaled by total dollar volume.  
 
< Table 7 here > 
 
The results from the different specifications and subsamples are largely consistent with 
our base case estimates.  Dark trading is associated with improved liquidity and informational 
efficiency (decreased illiquidity and informational inefficiency) across all proxies and 
specifications with few exceptions.  Our results are robust to using the regulation as the only 
instrument, allowing for heterogeneity in the impact of the instrumental variables, allowing for 
transitory effects around the rule change, and constraining the sample to only cross-listed stocks.  
The effect of dark trading is qualitatively similar in the largest and the smallest stocks in our 
sample, consistent with Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) who find that the effects of dark 
trading on price discovery are similar in both large and small stocks.  The magnitudes and 
statistical significance of the effects tend to be greater in small stocks. 
Finally, we examine whether the effects of dark trading are different in stocks that are 
constrained by the tick size (trade at a spread of one tick), compared to those that are not.  For 
stocks that are constrained by the tick size, dark trades are more likely to occur at the midquote 
than in stocks that are not constrained (e.g., after the regulation, dark trades in tick constrained 
stocks can only take place at the midquote).  Under the hypothesis that two-sided dark trading is 
beneficial to liquidity, we would thus expect that dark trading in stocks that are not constrained 
by the tick size is more beneficial to liquidity than dark trading in stocks that are constrained.  
The last two columns of Table 7 report estimates for stocks that are more/less frequently 
constrained by the tick size.  Consistent with our hypothesis, the beneficial effects of dark trading 
are more pronounced (more statistically significant effects and greater magnitudes) for stocks that 
are least often constrained by the tick size.   
 
5.3. Instrumental variables regressions for different types of dark trading 
To provide a more formal analysis of whether different types of dark trading have 
different effects on market quality, we disaggregate dark trading into two-sided dark trading with 
fractional price improvement (𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) and one-sided midpoint dark trading (𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡).  
Both types are measured as a fraction of total dollar volume.  Following a similar approach to the 
previous section, the first-stage regressions are: 
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𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,        (4)  
𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡.           (5)  
The model above is exactly identified.
29
  In robustness tests, we estimate an over-identified model 
with an expanded instrument set including the lagged stock price, and find similar results.  We 
also estimate an instrumental variables model that allows for heterogeneity in the effects of the 
regulation and find similar results.  
In the second-stage regressions we include the fitted values of one-sided and two-sided 
dark trading together to estimate their independent impact on market quality:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽2𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡.        (6) 
Table 8 reports the second-stage estimates for Canada.  Consistent with our hypotheses, 
one-sided and two-sided dark trading have different effects on market quality.  Two-sided dark 
trading is associated with strong improvements in almost all of the liquidity and informational 
efficiency metrics.
30
  An exception is the marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level) 
negative relation between the amount of two-sided dark trading and depth in the lit markets.  This 
effect, however, is small in magnitude compared with the effects on spreads.  For example, the 
average level of two-sided dark trading prior to the regulation is around 5% of total dollar 
volume.  If this level of two-sided dark trading were exogenously doubled holding other factors 
fixed, i.e., a 200% increase in two-sided dark trading, depth would be expected to decrease by an 
estimated 1.25%.
31
  For comparison, the expected changes in spreads for the same change in two-
sided dark trading are -0.45 bps for quoted spreads, -0.83 bps for effective spreads, and -0.86 bps 
for realized spreads, representing decreases of 4% to 38% of the pre-regulation means.  Thus, the 
effect of two-sided dark trading on depth is much smaller than its effect on spreads.   
The weak negative relation between two-sided dark trading and lit depth could result 
from posted liquidity being split between lit and two-sided dark venues and thus does not 
necessarily imply a decline in overall liquidity.  Because we are unable to observe depth in dark 
markets, we are unable to test how two-sided dark trading affects aggregate depth (summing 
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 The F-statistic for the joint hypothesis that the instruments are not significant in the first stage is 8,402 in 
regression Eq. (4) and 1,287 in regression Eq. (5), which is greater than the critical values specified in 
Stock and Yogo (2005), indicating the instruments are strong. 
30
 For conciseness, from here on we do not report the results of the variance ratio as it is related to 
autocorrelation and produces qualitatively similar results.  The Internet Appendix reports additional results 
using the variance ratio.  
31
 Doubling the level of two-sided dark trading is an increase of 0.05, implying a change in the natural log 
depth of 0.05 × −0.25 = −0.00125, which is a decrease in depth of approximately 1.25%.  In dollar 
terms, the mean depth before the regulation is around $49,020 (𝑒10.8, converting back from log terms), 
which would be expected to decrease to around $48,441 if two-sided dark trading was to double. 
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across lit and dark markets).  However, we are able to test whether depth relative to the amount of 
trading activity that remains in the lit markets is affected by two-sided dark trading.  We compute 
the ratio of lit dollar depth to lit traded dollar volume and use this relative depth measure as the 
dependent variable.  We find that dark trading (aggregate dark trading, two-sided dark trading, 
and one-sided dark trading) is not significantly related to relative depth, consistent with the notion 




In contrast to the largely beneficial effects of two-sided dark trading, the effect of one-
sided dark trading is somewhat mixed for the different market quality measures and is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero for most of the market quality metrics.  For example, the results 
suggest that one-sided dark trading is associated with higher absolute autocorrelations 
(marginally statistically significant), but lower high-frequency volatility and effective spreads.  
The latter is a somewhat mechanical effect because midpoint dark trades by definition occur at 
zero effective spreads.  Therefore, the results support the hypothesis that different types of dark 
trading have different effects on the market.  Two-sided dark trading has clear benefits for market 
quality.  In contrast, the effects of one-sided dark trading are weaker with no conclusive evidence 
of positive or negative effects. 
 
< Table 8 here > 
 
We again subject our analysis to a range of robustness tests, which we summarize in 
Table 9.  The first of the robustness tests is an alternative instrumental variables model that does 
not rely on lagged dark trading and instead makes greater use of the cross-sectional heterogeneity 
in the effects of the regulation.  The intuition behind this alternative is as follows.  For different 
stocks, the regulation has different effects on 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡.  For example, some 
stocks have a large reduction in 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 around the regulation, while others experience a 
small change or no change.  Similarly, some stocks have a large reduction in 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, while 
others have a small change or no change.  As long as the stocks that have a large reduction in 
𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 are not exactly the same stocks that have a large reduction in 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (i.e., the 
cross-sectional correlation of the regulation’s impact on 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is less than 
perfect), then the stocks that have a large reduction in 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 will allow the effect of 
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 These results are reported in the Internet Appendix. 
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𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 on market quality to be identified.  Similarly, the stocks that have a large reduction 
in 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 will allow the effects of 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 on market quality to be identified. 
We examine whether there is sufficient cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effects of the 
regulation to reliably identify the independent effects of one-sided and two-sided dark trading.  
The details are in the Internet Appendix.
33
  We conclude that the variation necessary for 
identification of the effects of one-sided and two-sided dark trading is present.  However, 
identification of the effects of one-sided dark trading is driven by a relatively small number of 
stocks and therefore is likely to be imprecise relative to the paper’s other results.  Consequently, 
the mixed results about the effects of one-sided dark trading should be taken with some caution 
due to the lower statistical power compared to tests of the effects of two-sided dark trading. 
For each stock separately, we estimate first-stage models for 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 and first-stage 
models for 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡.  This is equivalent to: 
𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑘 (𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘 𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑘
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡  
)242𝑘=1 + 𝑖𝑡 ,          (7) 
𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝑘 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘 𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑘
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡  
)242𝑘=1 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡 ,          (8) 
where 𝐷𝑘 is a dummy variable for each of the 𝑘 = 1,2, … 242 Canadian stocks in our sample.  
The model has 242 instruments to identify two endogenous variables and is thus over-identified. 
Results from this alternative instrumental variables model are reported in Table 9 column 
(2).  The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline model reported in column (1).  The other 
robustness tests in Table 9 indicate that the results are robust to using only the subset of cross-
listed stocks, omitting two weeks either side of the minimum price improvement regulation, using 
the US side of cross-listed stocks as a control group, and running the analysis separately on the 
most/least tick size constrained stocks.  In particular, the positive effect of dark trading with two-
sided price improvement on liquidity and informational efficiency remains strong, whereas the 
effect of one-sided dark trading is weak and somewhat mixed.  Columns (6) and (7) show that the 
effects of one-sided and two-sided dark trading are qualitatively similar in large and small stocks, 
but of greater magnitude in small stocks.  Additional robustness tests reported in the Internet 
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 Fig. 4 shows that almost all stocks experience a decrease or no change in two-sided dark trading around 
the minimum price improvement requirements, whereas the changes in one-sided dark trading are 
distributed fairly symmetrically around a positive mean.  These distributions suggest that it might be 
difficult to identify the effects of one-sided dark trading because that requires a sufficient number of stocks 
that have a small change (or no change) in two-sided dark trading yet have sufficient variation in one-sided 
dark trading changes.  In the Internet Appendix we show that 40 of our 242 stocks have little or no change 
in two-sided dark trading (an absolute change less than 2%) and that for such stocks there is at least as 
much variation in one-sided dark trading changes as there is for the 202 stocks that have a large change in 
two-sided dark trading. 
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Appendix show that our results are robust to alternative measurement frequencies for the 
informational efficiency metrics, using simple one-stage OLS regressions, excluding $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 
from the first stage, and using dark dollar volume that is not scaled by total dollar volume. 
The Internet Appendix compares our findings with those of Comerton-Forde, Malinova, 
and Park (2015) and describes additional analysis that reconciles the differences in findings.  We 
find that while our results hold consistently across most subsets of stocks, the effects of dark 
trading are largely statistically insignificant in the most liquid Canadian cross-listed stocks and, 
for some measures, different to the effects of dark trading in other groups of stocks. The group of 
the most liquid cross-listed stocks is a small fraction of all Canadian stocks.  Furthermore, the 
tendency for dark trading to have stronger effects in smaller and less liquid stocks suggests that 
our findings are likely to generalize to stocks that are not part of the TSX Composite Index.   
 
< Table 9 here > 
 
5.4. Comparison with dark trading in Australia 
Subsequent to the Canadian introduction of minimum price improvement rules in 
October 2012, Australia introduced similar regulation on May 26, 2013.  We repeat our analysis 
for the Australian market to assess the extent to which our main results generalize to different 
market structures.  We use data for the ASX 200 Index constituents (200 of the most actively 
traded Australian stocks) for a period of two months before and two months after the rules come 
into effect, consistent with our analysis of the Canadian data.
34
 
There are some noteworthy differences in the structure of the Australian equity markets 
and the nature of dark trading in Australia compared to Canada.
35
  First, Australian dark pools are 
used by brokers for internalization of client order flow as well as facilitating client-to-client 
trades, similar to the US, but contrary to Canada.  In Canada the order exposure rule, fair access 
regulations, requirements for price improvement on internalized orders, and broker preferencing 
on most trading venues have hampered off-market internalization.  Second, before the minimum 
price improvement requirements, dark trades in Australia were permitted at or within the best bid 
and ask on the lit market, whereas in Canada some, albeit minimal price improvement (e.g., 10% 
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 We obtain data from the AusEquities and Thomson Reuters Tick History databases maintained by the 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific.  Our data allow us to precisely identify all dark trades 
using flags attached to trades.  Our data also provide a complete record of all trades and quotes on lit 
markets with millisecond timestamp precision. 
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of the spread) was required even before the new rules came into effect.  Third, while lit liquidity 
is less fragmented in Australia than it is in Canada, dark liquidity in Australia is spread across a 
larger number of trading venues than in Canada.  Australia has two lit venues: the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX), which executes approximately 70.5% of consolidated dollar volume 
in its lit limit order book during our sample period, and Chi-X Australia, which launched in 2011 
and executes around 6.3% of consolidated dollar volume in its lit limit order book.  Dark trading 
occurs in two exchange-operated venues (ASX Centre Point, a midpoint dark pool; and dark 
orders on Chi-X, which interact with lit orders on Chi-X) and around 21 broker-operated dark 
pools.  The most active broker-operated dark pools in terms of turnover are those operated by 
Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup (ASIC, 2015).  Unlike the exchange-operated dark 
venues and dark orders, each broker-operated dark pool is only accessible to a small fraction of 
the market.  This contrasts with Canadian dark pools that allow access to all brokers under the 
Canadian fair access regulations.  Some of the broker-operated Australian dark pools are virtually 
connected by dark liquidity aggregators that are able to access multiple dark pools.  To varying 
degrees, the broker-operated dark pools facilitate client-to-client trading and broker 
internalization of client order flow.  
There are also noteworthy differences in how the minimum price improvement 
requirements were implemented in Australia compared to Canada.
36
  Perhaps the most significant 
is that the minimum price improvement requirements for dark trades were accompanied by a 
reduction in the block trade size threshold.  Block trades in Australia are allowed to be negotiated 
away from the lit markets at any price (even after the minimum price improvement requirements 
for dark trades) and immediately reported to either the ASX or Chi-X Australia.  Prior to the rule 
changes, for a single trade to qualify as a block trade and be exempt from the requirements for lit 
or dark trades, it had to have a value of at least $1 million.  After the rule changes, trades could 
qualify as block trades if they exceeded either $0.2 million, $0.5 million, or $1 million, depending 
on the liquidity category of the stock.   
The minimum price improvement requirements in Australia had a similar impact on dark 
trading as in Canada.  The amount of dark trading fell virtually overnight from 15.2% of total 
dollar volume before the regulation to 9.2% after.  One of the reasons why the decline in dark 
trading in Australia was larger than in Canada is that the accompanying reductions in block size 
thresholds allowed large dark orders to be executed as blocks and bypass the minimum price 
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 See Foley and Putniņš (2014) for details of the Australian regulation and how it compares to the 
Canadian minimum price improvement requirements. 
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improvement requirements (block trading increased from around 9.7% to 12.5% of total dollar 
volume).  The fraction of dark dollar volume executed at the midquote increased from 46% 
before the regulation to 81% after.  Therefore, the minimum price improvement requirements in 
Australia also provide a useful instrument to analyze the causal effects of dark trading.    
Tables 10 and 11 report estimates of the effects of dark trading in Australia, using 2SLS 
instrumental variables models similar to those used in our analysis of dark trading in Canada.
37
  
Aggregating across the two types of dark trading (Table 10), we find that dark trading in 
Australia is largely beneficial to market quality, consistent with our findings for Canada.  The 
statistically significant results indicate that dark trading leads to narrower quoted spreads, lower 
price impacts as measured by Amihud’s 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡, more lit market depth, and lower levels of high-
frequency volatility (controlling for low-frequency volatility).  The magnitudes of the effects are 
economically meaningful; for example, an increase in dark trading by 5% of total dollar volume 
is expected to decrease average quoted spreads by approximately 1.1 bps (0.05×(–21.44)) and 
increase depth by approximately 4.3% (0.05×(–21.44)).  A one-standard-deviation increase in 
dark trading is expected to decrease 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 by 18% of a standard deviation and decrease high-
frequency volatility by 9% of a standard deviation. 
 
< Table 10 here > 
 
Table 11 shows that similar to the results for Canada, one-sided and two-sided dark 
trading in Australia differ in their effects on market quality.  Two-sided dark trading tends to 
benefit liquidity, with statistically significant effects on quoted spreads, 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡, and depth, and 
no statistically significant detrimental effects.  One-sided dark trading is associated with lower 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡, higher depth, and less high-frequency volatility (marginally statistically significant 
impact), but larger delay in stocks reflecting market-wide information (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡).
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  Unlike two-
sided dark trading, one-sided dark trading is not associated with narrower spreads; in fact the 
point estimate suggests the opposite, although the effect is not statistically distinguishable from 
zero.  On balance, consistent with the Canadian results and our hypotheses, we find less 
consistent beneficial effects for one-sided dark trading than two-sided.   
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 We exclude the 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 control variable as trends in the Australian market are unlikely to be 
sufficiently similar to those in the US.   
38




< Table 11 here > 
 
The effects of dark trading in Australia are largely consistent with those in Canada, 
despite substantial differences in market structure and the way dark trading is used.  Our results 
for the Australian market are also consistent with two existing studies of dark trading in Australia.  
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) find that while high levels of dark trading can harm price 
discovery, low levels below 10% of dollar volume in individual stocks can be beneficial.  During 
the two months before the regulation, slightly over half of the stocks in our sample (54%) have a 
median level of dark trading below 10% indicating that for most of the market the level of dark 
trading was within the range where dark trading can be beneficial.
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Our results are largely consistent with Foley and Putniņš (2014) with the exception of a 
few differences.  We reconcile the differences with further analysis (reported in the Internet 
Appendix) in which we find the following.  In Australia, one-sided dark trading does not have a 
statistically significant effect on spreads during a four-month window around the regulation 
(Table 11), yet in a longer 18-month window one-sided dark trading is associated with 
significantly wider spreads.  We identify market structure changes that coincide with the change 
in the effects of one-sided dark trading.  In contrast, two-sided dark trading is beneficial to 
liquidity in both sample periods.  In the longer sample, the detrimental effects of one-sided dark 
trading on spreads outweigh the beneficial effects of two-sided dark trading.  These findings 
reinforce the two main conclusions of this paper: (i) one-sided and two-sided dark trading have 
different effects on market quality, with two-sided dark trading being more consistently 
beneficial, and (ii) the effects of the aggregate level of dark trading depend critically on the mix 
of one-sided and two-sided dark trading in the aggregate. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We use a unique natural experiment, the introduction of the minimum price improvement 
regulation in Canada and Australia, to examine the effects of dark trading.  We disaggregate dark 
trading into two types: dark trading at the midpoint of the lit NBBO (‘one-sided’ dark trading) 
and dark trading at prices that are either side of the midpoint (‘two-sided’ dark trading).  This 
partition is important both theoretically and empirically.  One-sided and two-sided dark trading 
                                                          
39
 Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) highlight that the 10% estimated threshold for individual stocks 
should not be compared to market-wide averages because high levels of dark trading in a few of the largest 
stocks can result in a market-wide average above 10% even if most stocks have levels below 10%. 
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differ in execution probability, the feasibility of dark market making strategies, and the amount of 
information that can be inferred from resting dark orders about trading intentions. 
We find that two-sided dark trading is beneficial to both liquidity and informational 
efficiency.  It tends to lower quoted, effective and realized spreads, reduces price impact 
measures of illiquidity, and makes prices closer to the random walk that would be expected under 
informational efficiency.  The magnitudes of the effects are economically meaningful and 
qualitatively similar in both Canada and Australia.      
In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that one-sided dark trading has a 
significant effect on market quality.  Aggregating across the two types of dark trading, our results 
suggest that aggregate dark trading is more likely to benefit market quality the greater the 
proportion of two-sided dark trading.  Furthermore, changes in the composition of dark trading 
can impact market quality even if the aggregate level remains unchanged.  An increase in two-
sided dark trading relative to one-sided dark trading is likely to benefit market quality.   
Our results are robust to a range of alternative specifications, fixed effects, sub-period 
tests, as well as controlling for time trends and confounding factors using a sample of matched 
US stocks.  The effects of dark trading are qualitatively similar for the largest and the smallest 
stocks in our Canadian sample, but of larger magnitude in small stocks.  The effects of dark 
trading are largely insignificant in a subset of the most liquid Canadian cross-listed stocks.  
Considering the non-trivial differences in Canadian and Australian market structure, the similarity 
of the results in Canada and Australia speak to the robustness of the effects of dark trading and 
the ability to generalize the paper’s findings.   
Our findings have two caveats.  First, the levels of dark trading in Canada and Australia 
are lower than in some other markets, in particular the US.  It is possible that the effects of dark 
trading on market quality are non-linear in the level of dark trading, and that the positive effects 
of two-sided dark trading dissipate beyond some ‘tipping’ point.  Second, our analysis of the 
Canadian market considers trading in dark pools and dark order types on lit markets, but not 
systematic internalization by brokers in off-market ‘internalizers’.  Internalization is associated 
with a range of different issues and should be analyzed as a separate type of dark trading.  
Although the Australian dark trading includes internalization, our data do not allow us to separate 
broker internalization from client-to-client dark trading. 
Our findings are consistent with theoretical studies.  For example, Boulatov and George 
(2013) find that less pre-trade transparency in limit order markets encourages informed traders to 
supply liquidity because they can profit from liquidity provision without revealing their private 
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information.  Our results suggest that strong competition in providing dark liquidity forces lit 
market liquidity providers to narrow spreads to compete with dark liquidity.  Consistent with our 
results, Boulatov and George (2013) also show that aggressive liquidity provision in the dark 
improves price discovery.  Our results are also consistent with the notion that fragmentation 
across lit and two-sided dark trading venues can benefit liquidity by increasing the number of 
liquidity providers (e.g., Biais, Martimort, and Rochet, 2000), encouraging liquidity provision 
through ‘queue jumping’ (e.g., Foucault and Menkveld, 2008), and allowing liquidity providers to 
compete on a finer pricing grid (e.g., Biais, Bisiere, and Spatt, 2010; Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, 
and Werner, 2014).  Lastly, Zhu (2014) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) show that 
midpoint dark trading can increase inventory and adverse selection risks.  While we do not find 
that midpoint dark trading harms liquidity, our results indicate that midpoint dark trading does not 
consistently benefit liquidity like two-sided dark trading, consistent with an opposing increase in 
inventory and adverse selection risks. 
This paper has a number of policy implications, in particular given the current regulatory 
interest in dark trading.  At the broadest level, the results imply that dark trading should not be 
treated as a homogenous group; it is important to distinguish between different types of dark 
trading when developing policy.  The effects of aggregate dark trading depend on the 
composition of dark trading types.  Our results suggest that the larger the proportion of two-sided 
dark trading in the aggregate the more likely the aggregate dark trading benefits market quality.  
A harmful level of aggregate dark trading in one country might not be harmful in another due to 
differences in the composition of dark trading types.  In designing regulation it is important to 
consider the effect on the level of dark trading and also on the composition of dark trading types.  
The minimum price improvement rules in Canada and Australia decreased the level of dark 
trading but also caused substitution from two-sided dark trading to one-sided dark trading.   
Finally, our results have implications for tick size regulation because the tick size can 
affect the structure of dark trading when minimum price improvement rules are imposed.  Our 
results suggest that using dark trading as a way of obtaining a finer price grid can benefit market 
quality as long as the price grid allows dark liquidity to concurrently exist on both the buy- and 
sell-sides of the market.  Minimum price improvement rules can force two-sided dark markets out 
of existence in stocks that are constrained by the tick size and consequently have unintended 
negative effects on market quality.  Our results suggest that minimum price improvement 
requirements can be improved by ensuring tick sizes do not constrain the lit spread so as to avoid 
forcing two-sided dark markets out of existence. 
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Appendix A: Liquidity and informational efficiency metrics 
When calculating market quality metrics we use the regular market hours of 9:30am – 
4:00pm, less the first and last 15 minutes to exclude the impacts of the opening auction and 
market on close facility.  However we include the first and last 15 minutes as well as the opening 
and closing auctions in the summations of daily volume.   
 
A.1. Liquidity measures 
We measure liquidity using quoted, effective and realized spreads, Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity metric, and depth.  All liquidity metrics are calculated for each stock-day.  We measure 
the quoted NBBO spread in bps relative to the prevailing midquote, 𝑚 = (𝐴𝑠𝑘 + 𝐵𝑖𝑑)/2,  
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = (𝐴𝑠𝑘 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑)/𝑚  ,                                            (A1) 
and take the time-weighted average between 9:45am and 3:45pm for each stock-day.  For a trade 
that occurs at time 𝜏 we measure its effective spread and five-minute realized spread (both in 
basis points relative to the prevailing midquote) as 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2𝑞[(𝑝𝜏 − 𝑚𝜏)/𝑚𝜏]  ,                                       (A2) 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2𝑞[(𝑝𝜏 − 𝑚𝜏+5)/𝑚𝜏]  ,                                       (A3) 
where 𝑝𝜏 is the transaction price, 𝑚𝜏 is the midpoint of the NBBO prevailing at the time of the 
trade, 𝑚𝜏+5 is the midpoint of the NBBO five minutes after the trade, and 𝑞 indicates the 
direction of the trade (+1 for buyer-initiated trades and –1 for seller initiated trades).  Buyer- and 
seller-initiated trades are identified by comparing the prevailing NBBO to the transaction price 
using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm in Canada (in Australia, the data identify the trade 
initiator).  For each stock-day we take the volume-weighted average effective and realized spread 
across all lit trades.  
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity metric is a measure of price impact scaled by traded dollar 
volume.  For each stock-day we compute the average ratio of hourly absolute midquote returns to 
hourly dollar volume:  







ℎ=1 ]  ,                                    (A4) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡,ℎ and $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡,ℎ are the midquote return and traded dollar volume, respectively, for 
stock 𝑖 during hour ℎ of day 𝑡.40  To reduce the influence of outliers we winsorize the liquidity 
metrics at the 1% level for each stock and each date.  
                                                          
40
 As indicated in Eq. (4) the 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 metric is log transformed to reduce the impact of outliers, consistent 
with Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012).  If there is no volume traded in a given hour, the denominator in 
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 We measure depth as the log of the time-weighted average quoted dollar depth available 
to be bought and sold at the NBBO on all lit venues. 
 
A.2. Informational efficiency measures 
We use four high-frequency measures of the informational efficiency of prices: 
autocorrelations, variance ratios, high-frequency standard deviations, and measures of short-term 
return predictability using lagged market returns.  
Positive or negative midquote return autocorrelations indicate that quotes deviate from a 
stochastic random walk and exhibit short-term return predictability.  Such predictability is mainly 
driven by partial price adjustment to information, including under- and over-reaction (see 
Anderson, Eom, Hahn, and Park, 2013), which is inconsistent with an informationally efficient 
market.  We calculate the absolute value of first-order midquote return autocorrelations for each 
stock-day, at three intraday frequencies, 𝑘 ∈ {10sec. ,30sec. , 60sec. }, similar to Hendershott and 
Jones (2005):  
 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 = |𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑘,𝜏, 𝑟𝑘,𝜏−1)| ,                                            (A5) 
where 𝑟𝑘,𝜏 is the 𝜏
th
 midquote return of length 𝑘 in a given stock-day.  Taking the absolute value 
of the autocorrelation yields a measure of informational efficiency that measures both the under- 
and over-reaction of returns to information, with larger values indicating greater inefficiency.  
Throughout the paper we report results using 𝑘 = 10sec., and in the Internet Appendix we show 
that our results are robust to using the other frequencies as well as combining the various 
autocorrelation measures into a single one by calculating their first principal component.   
For stock prices that follow a random walk, the variance of returns is a linear function of 
the return measurement frequency, i.e., 𝜎
𝑘-PeriodReturn
2  is 𝑘 times larger than 𝜎
1-PeriodReturn
2 .  The 
variance ratio makes use of this property to measure inefficiency as a price series’ deviation from 
the characteristics that would be expected under a random walk (e.g., Lo and MacKinlay, 1988).  
We construct three variance ratios for each stock-day, utilizing different intra-day frequencies:  




2 − 1| ,                                                     (A6) 
where 𝜎𝑙
2 and 𝜎𝑘𝑙
2  are the variances of 𝑙-second and 𝑘𝑙-second midquote returns for a given stock-
day.  Higher values are associated with greater inefficiency.  We use the (𝑙,𝑘𝑙) combinations: 
(1sec., 10sec.), (10sec., 60sec.), (1min., 5min.).  Throughout the paper we report results using the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡  metric is zero.  Rather than generating a missing observation we replace such instances with the 
stock’s 99
th
 percentile value of valid |𝑟𝑖𝑡,ℎ|/$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡,ℎ observations. 
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combination of frequencies (10sec., 60sec.), and in the Internet Appendix we show that our 
results are robust to using the other frequency combinations as well as combining the various 
variance ratios into a single one by calculating their first principal component.   
 For each stock-day we also estimate the intra-day midquote standard deviations 
(𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) calculated using returns of 10, 30 and 60 second horizons.  𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a 
proxy for noise and temporary deviations of prices from their equilibrium values due to trading 
frictions.  In the regressions we control for volatility of the fundamental value using a lower 
frequency measure of realized variance.  Throughout the paper we report results using ten-second 
returns, and in the Internet Appendix we show that our results are robust to using the other 
frequencies as well as combining the various frequency 𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 estimates into a single 
one by calculating their first principal component. 
The final measure of informational efficiency is an intraday adaptation of the Hou and 
Moskowitz (2005) 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 metric.  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 measures short-term return predictability by the 
extent to which lagged market returns predict a stock’s midquote returns.  For each stock-day 𝑖𝑡 
we estimate a regression of intraday one-minute midquote returns for the stock, 𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝜏, on the 
TSX60 market index return, 𝑟𝑚𝑡,𝜏, and ten lags: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑡,𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡,𝑘𝑟𝑚𝑡,𝜏−𝑘 + 𝑖𝑡,𝜏
10
𝑘=1   .                                      (A7) 
We save the R2 from this unconstrained regression, 𝑅𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡
2 , re-estimate the regression 
constraining the coefficients on all lagged market returns to zero (i.e., 𝛿𝑖𝑡,𝑘 = 0, ∀𝑘), and save the 
R2 from the constrained regression, 𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡
2 .  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 is calculated from the ratio of the 
constrained and unconstrained regression 𝑅2s:  




2 )  .                            (A8) 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 takes values between zero and 100 and describes the amount of variation in a stock’s 
intraday returns that is explained by lagged market returns.  The more explanatory power the 
lagged returns have, the higher is 𝑅𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡
2  and the closer is 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 to 100, implying a 
delayed incorporation of market-wide information into the stock’s price, and lower overall 
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Summary of all trading venues in Canada 
This table provides an overview of all lit and dark trading venues in Canada.  The types of orders allowed 
include lit-only, dark-only or both lit and dark.  The approximate market share of total traded dollar volume 
(including dark and lit trades on all listed venues) is reported for the two months preceding the minimum 
price improvement rules (August 15, 2012 – October 14, 2012) and two months after (October 15, 2012 – 
December 15, 2012).  The market share of Liquidnet / Instinet is obtained from IIROC statistics, whereas 











TSX Both 59.5% 56.4% 
Chi-X Both 14.1% 20.8% 
Alpha (Lit) Both (after Oct 15, 2012) 14.7% 13.0% 
MatchNow Dark 4.7% 4.9% 
Alpha Intraspread Dark 3.1% 0.3% 
Pure Lit 1.8% 1.8% 
TMX Select Lit 1.3% 1.6% 
Omega Lit 0.7% 0.9% 




Descriptive statistics on trading activity 
This table reports descriptive statistics on market-wide dark and lit trading activity in Canada during the two months preceding the 
minimum price improvement rules (August 15, 2012 – October 14, 2012) and two months after (October 15, 2012 – December 15, 
2012).  The trading activity variables are calculated on each trading day, pooling across all stocks in our sample (TSX Composite Index 
constituents).  The mean, median and standard deviation are calculated from the daily observations.  The last two columns report the 
difference in means pre/post regulation, and the significance of the difference using a two-tailed t-test.  Standard errors are clustered 
both by stock and date.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 





  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
  Difference t-statistic 
Dark $volume / total $volume (%) 9.01 7.58 7.00 
 
5.93 4.05 6.33 
 
-3.07 (-10.16)*** 
Dark trade size ($1,000) 6.19 4.64 8.75 
 
6.40 4.73 9.24 
 
0.21 (0.76) 
Lit trade size ($1,000) 6.16 4.59 7.97 
 
6.09 4.48 7.77 
 
-0.07 (-0.33) 
Dark daily $ volume ($100m) 4.92 4.90 0.89 
 
3.21 3.32 0.71 
 
-1.71 (-9.67)*** 
Lit daily $ volume ($100m) 57.41 53.97 18.73 
 
56.68 57.94 13.88 
 
-0.73 (-0.20) 
Total daily $ volume ($100m) 62.01 58.82 19.13 
 







Descriptive statistics on liquidity, informational efficiency and control variables 
This table reports descriptive statistics on liquidity, informational efficiency and control variables in Canada during the 
two months preceding the minimum price improvement rules (August 15, 2012 – October 14, 2012) and two months 
after (October 15, 2012 – December 15, 2012).  Quoted spreads are time-weighted based on the lit national best bid and 
offer (NBBO).  Realized and effective spreads are volume-weighted averages for the trades in each stock-day.  Realized 
spreads are calculated using the NBBO midquote five minutes after the trade.  Quoted, effective and realized spreads 
are measured relative to the midquote, in basis points.  𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 is Amihud’s price impact metric calculated for each 
stock-day using hourly return and volume observations.  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of the time-weighted quoted dollar 
depth at the NBBO.  𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 are ten-second midquote return absolute autocorrelations 
and standard deviations, respectively.  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  measures the variance ratio of the standard deviation of ten-
second and one-minute midquote returns.  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  measures intraday midquote return predictability using lagged 
market returns.  $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar volume.  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of the stock’s 
market capitalization.  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote.  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the time-weighted midquote.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of the trading day for which the stock’s 
NBBO spread is constrained at one tick.  The last two columns report the difference in means pre/post regulation, and 
the significance of the difference using a two-tailed t-test.  Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Pre-Regulation   Post-Regulation     
 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
  Difference t-stat 
Panel A. Liquidity variables  
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  12.69 9.66 11.03  
13.26 10.11 12.37 
 
0.56 (2.66)*** 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  10.44 7.64 9.93  
11.28 8.08 11.94 
 
0.84 (3.58)*** 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  2.29 1.56 11.65  
3.49 2.15 13.38 
 
1.21 (4.46)*** 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 1.74 1.51 1.21  
1.80 1.53 1.30 
 
0.06 (2.03)** 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  10.86 10.67 0.93   10.82 10.64 0.92   -0.05 (-2.17)*** 
Panel B. Informational inefficiency variables  
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  0.05 0.04 0.04  
0.06 0.04 0.05 
 
0.01 (4.96)*** 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  0.13 0.11 0.11  
0.15 0.12 0.12 
 
0.02 (5.62)*** 
𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  2.88 2.51 1.66  
3.1 2.71 1.82 
 
0.22 (3.05)*** 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  86.12 91.94 15.50  
87.01 92.63 14.86 
 
0.89 (1.82)* 
Panel C. Control variables  
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  15.76 15.63 1.40  
15.73 15.63 1.46 
 
-0.03 (-0.58) 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 21.81 21.53 1.19  
21.79 21.52 1.19 
 
-0.01 (-1.68)* 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 196.29 157.99 142.77  
193.03 158.91 137.15 
 
-3.26 (-0.53) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  ($) 27.42 22.02 29.67  
27.31 22.29 29.31 
 
-0.10 (-0.52) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  (%) 58.80 65.69 35.33  








First-stage regressions of the impact of minimum price improvement rules on dark trading 
This table reports estimates from first-stage instrumental variables regressions in which the endogenous 
variable for which we instrument is the level of dark trading (measured as a fraction of total dollar volume), 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡: 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
The instrumental variables are 𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  (a dummy variable that takes the value one after the minimum price 
improvement rules come into effect and zero before), and 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 (the lagged level of dark trading). The set 
of control variables includes the following.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a trend variable that starts at zero at the beginning of the 
sample period and increments by one every trading day.  𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 is the daily mean of a market quality 
metric (the market quality metric that is the dependent variable in the second stage) estimated for a matched 
sample of US firms.  Consequently, the first stage is estimated separately for each market quality metric. This 
table reports results using quoted spreads in 𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡. $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar volume.  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is 
the percentage of the trading day for which the stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at one tick. Specification 
(2) is identical to specification (1) with the addition of stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered both by 
stock and date, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments do not 
affect the level of dark trading.  The sample comprises TSX Composite Index stocks during the period August 
15, 2012 to December 15, 2012.  
 
 Variable (1) (2) 




𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.03 -0.02 
 
(-14.37)*** (-12.08)*** 
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 0.03 0.23 
 
(3.86)*** (19.92)*** 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 -0.00 0.00 
 
(-0.05) (1.45) 
𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.00 0.00 
 
(3.05)*** (0.21) 
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.01 -0.02 
 
(-19.04)*** (-23.12)*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 -0.50 0.02 
 
(-14.87)*** (0.45) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 0.00 0.01 
 
(0.38) (2.33)** 
   
Observations 19,233 19,233 
Adjusted R
2
 8% 30% 
F-statistic 1,312 826 






Second-stage regressions of the impact of dark trading on liquidity 
This table reports estimates from second-stage instrumental variables regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. 
The dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , are estimates of liquidity and transaction costs for each stock-day.  Quoted 
spreads are time-weighted based on the lit national best bid and offer (NBBO).  Realized and effective 
spreads are volume-weighted averages for the trades in each stock-day.  Realized spreads are calculated 
using the NBBO midquote five minutes after the trade.  Quoted, effective and realized spreads are 
measured relative to the midquote, in basis points.  𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 is Amihud’s price impact metric calculated for 
each stock-day using hourly return and volume observations.  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of the time-
weighted quoted dollar depth at the NBBO.  The key independent variable, 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ , is the fitted value of a 
stock-day’s dark dollar volume as a fraction of the stock-day’s total dollar volume (from the first stage).  
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a trend variable that starts at zero at the beginning of the sample period and increments by one 
every trading day.  𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 is the daily mean of the market quality metric (the same metric as the 
dependent variable) in a matched sample of US firms.  $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar 
volume.  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of the trading day for which the stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at 
one tick.  Adjusted R
2
s do not include the variance explained by the fixed effects (𝛼𝑖).  Standard errors are 
clustered both by stock and date, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The sample comprises TSX Composite 














 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂  -3.98 -13.78 -13.93 -0.65 -0.10 
 
(-2.61)*** (-6.42)*** (-2.61)*** (-2.66)*** (-0.74) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 
(3.36)*** (3.34)*** (3.18)*** (0.82) (-5.12)*** 
𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.48 
 
(5.82)*** (1.61) (1.19) (3.77)*** (13.93)*** 
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.84 -0.38 0.70 -0.48 0.15 
 
(-15.61)*** (-4.13)*** (2.68)*** (-50.68)*** (23.92)*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 47.58 56.39 -191.27 8.24 -5.87 
 
(17.72)*** (12.77)*** (-13.44)*** (19.40)*** (-19.26)*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 -12.66 -9.14 -5.39 -0.20 0.88 
 
(-51.55)*** (-25.73)*** (-5.61)*** (-5.78)*** (34.54)*** 
     
 
Observations 19,233 19,233 19,233 19,233 19,233 
Adjusted R
2
 30% 9% 2% 25% 21% 







Second-stage regressions of the impact of dark trading on informational efficiency 
This table reports estimates from second-stage instrumental variables regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. 
The dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , are estimates of informational efficiency for each stock-day. 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  are absolute autocorrelations and standard deviations of ten-second 
midquote returns, respectively.  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  is the variance ratio of ten-second and one-minute 
midquote returns.  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  measures intraday midquote return predictability using lagged market returns. 
The key independent variable, 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ , is the fitted value of a stock-day’s dark dollar volume as a fraction 
of the stock-day’s total dollar volume (from the first stage).  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a trend variable that starts at zero at 
the beginning of the sample period and increments by one every trading day.  𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 is the daily mean 
of the market quality metric (the same metric as the dependent variable) in a matched sample of US firms.  
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar volume.  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the stock-day’s high-low price range 
divided by the time-weighted midquote. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of the trading day for which the 
stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at one tick. Adjusted R
2
s do not include the variance explained by the 
fixed effects (𝛼𝑖).  Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date, t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The 
sample comprises TSX Composite Index stocks during the period August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012. 
 
Variable 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  
𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂  -0.06 -0.16 -1.49 -2.11 
 
(-2.83)*** (-3.01)*** (-4.27)*** (-0.34) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
(2.02)** (3.60)*** (3.87)*** (1.79)* 
𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.18 0.00 0.24 22.13 
 
(4.33)*** (0.14) (14.82)*** (7.86)*** 
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.00 -0.00 0.22 0.58 
 
(-1.13) (-0.07) (17.09)*** (2.55)** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 -0.05 -0.03 64.75 -69.69 
 
(-1.35) (-0.41) (54.30)*** (-6.30)*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 -0.02 -0.03 -1.70 -2.32 
 




Observations 19,205 19,219 19,233 19,205 
Adjusted R
2
 3% 4% 57% 6% 







This table reports coefficients of the key independent variable in the second-stage instrumental variables regressions, for a variety of different specifications.  The 
independent variable to which the coefficient estimates correspond is the fitted value of a stock-day’s dark dollar volume as a fraction of the stock-day’s total dollar 
volume (𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ ).  The rows correspond to different dependent variables and the columns correspond to different specifications/samples and are used to assess the 
robustness of the results.  Specification (1) is the base case specification for the sake of comparison (the specification reported in Tables 5 and 6, using TSX Composite 
Index stocks during the period August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012).  Specification (2) is identical to specification (1) except that it uses a single instrumental 
variable, the post-regulation dummy variable. Specification (3) is identical to specification (1) except that it includes cross-listed securities only.  Specification (4) is 
identical to specification (1) except that the first-stage regression is estimated on each stock separately.  Specification (5) is identical to specification (1) omitting two 
weeks either side of the introduction of the minimum price improvement rules.  Specification (6) uses the US side of cross-listed stocks as the control group.  
Specifications (7) and (8) are estimated on the largest 121 stocks and smallest 120 stocks, respectively, using the same variables as in specification (1). Specification (9) 
is identical to specification (1) except that the two stages are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood.  Specifications (10) and (11) are estimated on the 68 
stocks that are constrained by the tick size at least 90% of the time pre-regulation, and the 174 stocks that are constrained less than 90% of the time, respectively.  
Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date in all specifications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -3.98*** -6.21*** -3.33* -4.24*** -6.75*** -4.03*** -1.73 -4.47** -7.99*** -2.01 -4.26** 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -13.78*** -18.55*** -11.66*** -11.67*** -17.57*** -13.78*** -5.85*** -18.97*** -19.38*** -12.22*** -13.82*** 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -13.93*** -24.71** -11.17* -4.52 -22.61*** -13.91*** -4.47 -19.31** -24.87*** -5.73 -15.61** 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡  -0.65*** -2.57*** -0.73*** -0.67*** -0.32 -0.68*** -0.41* -0.81** -0.80*** -0.57 -0.61** 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  -0.10 0.81*** -0.07 -0.11 0.22 0.19 -0.08 -0.20 0.31*** -0.48 0.07 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  -0.06*** -0.37*** -0.05* -0.00 -0.04 -0.08*** -0.05* -0.07** -0.09*** 0.00 -0.09*** 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 -0.16*** -0.72*** 0.05 0.01 -0.16** -0.16*** -0.16** -0.16** -0.27*** 0.03 -0.23*** 
𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  -1.49*** -1.48** -1.60*** -0.44** -1.77*** -2.53*** -1.03*** -1.50*** -2.23*** -1.52** -1.79*** 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  -2.11 -24.55* -4.02 0.76 -5.79 -2.03 -0.69 -0.77 -8.91* 6.61 -5.50 
            
Observations 19,233 19,233 14,385 19,233 14,999 19,233 9,784 9,449 19,233 5,605 13,628 
First stage  Pooled Pooled Pooled By stock Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled 




The impact of different types of dark trading on market quality 
This table reports estimates from second-stage instrumental variables regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽2 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. 
The dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , are market quality metrics estimated each stock-day.  Quoted, effective, and realized spreads are measured 
relative to the midquote, in basis points.  𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 is Amihud’s price impact metric calculated each stock-day using hourly return and 
volume observations.  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of the time-weighted quoted dollar depth at the NBBO.  𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 
𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  are absolute autocorrelations and standard deviations of ten-second midquote returns, respectively.  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  measures 
intraday midquote return predictability using lagged market returns.  The key independent variables, 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  and 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ , are 
the fitted values of the fraction of dollar volume executed by dark trades with fractional price improvement and dark trades at the 
midquote, respectively.  The set of control variables is as follows.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a trend variable that starts at zero at the beginning of the 
sample period and increments by one every trading day.  𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 is the daily mean of the market quality metric (the same metric as 
the dependent variable) in a matched sample of US firms.  $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar volume. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the 
stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of the trading day for which 
the stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at one tick.  Adjusted R
2
s do not include the variance explained by the fixed effects (𝛼𝑖).  
Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The sample comprises TSX Composite Index stocks during the period August 




















 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  
𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  -8.98 -16.60 -17.22 -1.03 -0.25 -0.10 -1.09 -4.25 
 
(-8.34)*** (-9.24)*** (-3.76)*** (-4.77)*** (-1.93)* (-5.14)*** (-3.61)*** (-0.69) 
𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  0.16 -5.94 -4.69 0.15 -0.18 0.04 -1.25 4.75 
 
(0.10) (-2.69)*** (-0.85) (0.62) (-1.35) (1.69)* (-3.52)*** (0.81) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
(-0.07) (0.37) (1.31) (-1.93)* (-4.88)*** (-1.28) (4.03)*** (0.84) 
𝑈𝑆 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.49 0.16 0.24 21.75 
 
(3.71)*** (1.20) (1.09) (3.02)*** (13.73)*** (3.88)*** (14.74)*** (7.67)*** 
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.76 -0.14 0.95 -0.47 0.15 0.00 0.24 0.65 
 
(-17.34)*** (-1.65)* (3.86)*** (-57.23)*** (25.65)*** (0.97) (21.38)*** (3.35)*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 47.42 53.28 -194.05 8.24 -5.95 -0.04 64.21 -68.34 
 
(17.32)*** (11.90)*** (-13.65)*** (18.95)*** (-19.26)*** (-1.09) (53.51)*** (-6.08)*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 -12.57 -9.13 -5.34 -0.19 0.87 -0.02 -1.73 -2.18 
 
(-51.37)*** (-25.90)*** (-5.59)*** (-5.33)*** (34.64)*** (-6.45)*** (-29.15)*** (-2.37)** 
         
Observations 19,233 19,233 19,233 19,233 19,233 19,205 19,233 19,205 
Adjusted R
2
  30% 9% 2% 25% 21% 4% 57% 6% 




Further robustness tests separating two-sided and one-sided dark trading 
This table reports coefficients of the key independent variables in the second-stage instrumental variables regressions, for a variety of different specifications.  The 
independent variables to which the coefficient estimates correspond are the fitted value of a stock-day’s two-sided and one-sided dark dollar volume (𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  in 
Panel A and 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  in Panel B).  The rows correspond to different dependent variables and the columns correspond to different specifications/samples and are 
used to assess the robustness of the results.  Specification (1) is the base case specification for the sake of comparison (the specification reported in Table 8, using 
TSX Composite Index stocks during the period August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012).  Specification (2) is identical to specification (1) except as the set of 
instrumental variables, it uses interactions of the post-regulation dummy variable and dummy variables for each stock. Specification (3) is identical to specification 
(1) except that it includes only cross-listed securities. Specification (4) is identical to specification (1) omitting two weeks either side of the introduction of the 
minimum price improvement rules.  Specification (5) uses the US side of cross-listed stocks as the control group.  Specifications (6) and (7) are estimated using the 
largest 121 and smallest 120 stocks, respectively, using the same variables as specification (1).  Specifications (8) and (9) are estimated on the 68 stocks that are 
constrained by the tick size at least 90% of the time pre-regulation, and the 174 stocks that are constrained less than 90% of the time, respectively.  Standard errors are 
clustered both by stock and date in all specifications.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Two-sided dark trading coefficient estimates               
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -8.98*** -13.06*** -9.35*** -15.57*** -9.03*** -4.83*** -11.04*** -3.85*** -11.96*** 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -16.60*** -19.95*** -14.94*** -23.26*** -16.60*** -4.65*** -27.78*** -13.20*** -18.47*** 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -17.22*** -12.20*** -12.33** -25.38*** -17.21*** -11.92*** -21.67*** -11.46 -20.42*** 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡  -1.03*** -1.34*** -0.90*** -0.88*** -1.06*** -0.39** -1.77*** -0.99*** -0.91*** 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  -0.25* -0.29*** -0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.58*** -0.40* -0.23 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.18*** 
𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  -1.09*** -1.57*** -1.24*** -0.91** -2.56*** -0.51* -1.37*** -0.99* -1.84*** 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  -4.25 -5.52 -8.84 -5.88 -4.18 -1.02 -5.47 2.06 -7.70 
Panel B: One-sided dark trading coefficient estimates                
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  0.16 1.49 0.38 0.61 0.19 1.51 -0.25 -0.64 0.45 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -5.94*** -4.99*** -6.09*** -4.56* -5.95*** -2.98 -6.94* -8.42** -5.21** 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -4.69 2.63 -6.69 -4.55 -4.61 5.57 -11.41 -8.06 -3.72 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡  0.15 -0.44** -0.20 0.33 0.16 -0.10 0.38 0.91* 0.05 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  -0.18 -0.02 -0.24 -0.28* -0.23* -0.55*** 0.10 -1.85*** 0.12 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  0.04* 0.06*** 0.04* 0.07*** 0.04* 0.05* 0.03 0.07 0.03 
𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  -1.25*** -0.62** -1.26*** -1.62*** -0.77** -0.78** -1.43** -2.69** -1.15*** 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  4.75 2.37 4.01 6.29 4.77 10.19 1.71 20.02 2.25 
Observations 19,233 19,233 14,385 14,999 19,233 9,784 9,449 5,605 13,628 
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Table 10  
The impact of dark trading on market quality in Australia 
This table reports estimates for Australian stocks (ASX 200 Index constituents) for two months before and after the introduction of the 
minimum price improvement regulation on May 27, 2013.  Estimates are from second-stage instrumental variables regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. 
The dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , are estimates of informational efficiency for each stock-day. 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  are 
absolute autocorrelations and standard deviations of ten-second midquote returns, respectively. 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 measures intraday midquote 
return predictability using lagged market returns. The key independent variable, 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂ , is the fitted value of a stock-day’s dark dollar 
volume as a fraction of the stock-day’s total dollar volume (from the first stage).  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a trend variable that starts at zero at the 
beginning of the sample period and increments by one every trading day.  $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar volume.  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of the 
trading day for which the stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at one tick.  Adjusted R
2
s do not include the variance explained by the 
fixed effects (𝛼𝑖).  Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date, t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 





















𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡̂  -21.44 -12.32 5.37 -1.63 0.85 -0.01 -9.90 3.79 
 
(-3.97)*** (-1.22) (0.42) (-6.84)*** (6.18)*** (-0.38) (-3.14)*** (0.85) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.00 0.26 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 
(7.40)*** (3.56)*** (2.25)** (-4.94)*** (26.67)*** (-1.64) (-2.52)** (-0.58) 
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 -3.65 -6.03 -2.73 -0.26 -4.03 0.01 0.63 0.59 
 
(-8.30)*** (-7.32)*** (-2.32)** (-13.88)*** (-15.34)*** (3.86)*** (2.26)** (2.15)** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 163.62 263.10 -461.96 12.04 0.70 -0.45 152.16 -13.86 
 
(12.24)*** (13.49)*** (-12.65)*** (20.05)*** (18.49)*** (-10.41)*** (20.22)*** (-2.07)** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 -66.06 -41.87 -23.81 -1.45 0.00 -0.07 -17.49 0.23 
 
(-29.51)*** (-9.80)*** (-4.64)*** (-18.06)*** (1.10) (-9.05)*** (-11.55)*** (0.23) 
         
Observations 18,048 18,048 18,048 18,048 18,048 17,958 18,048 17,887 
Adjusted R
2
 26% 10% 6% 20% 22% 1% 16% 2% 







The impact of different types of dark trading on market quality in Australia 
This table reports estimates for Australian stocks (ASX 200 Index constituents) for two months before and after the introduction of the 
minimum price improvement regulation on May 27, 2013.  Estimates are from second-stage instrumental variables regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽2 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. 
The dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , are market quality metrics estimated each stock-day.  Quoted, effective, and realized spreads are measured 
relative to the midquote, in basis points.  𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 is Amihud’s price impact metric calculated each stock-day using hourly return and 
volume observations.  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of the time-weighted quoted dollar depth at the NBBO.  𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 
𝐻𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  are absolute autocorrelations and standard deviations of ten-second midquote returns, respectively.  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡  measures 
intraday midquote return predictability using lagged market returns.  The key independent variables, 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  and 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ , are 
the fitted values of the fraction of dollar volume executed by dark trades with fractional price improvement and dark trades at the 
midquote, respectively.  The set of control variables is as follows.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a trend variable that starts at zero at the beginning of the 
sample period and increments by one every trading day.  $𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of traded dollar volume. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the stock-
day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midquote.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of the trading day for which the 
stock’s NBBO spread is constrained at one tick.  Adjusted R
2
s do not include the variance explained by the fixed effects (𝛼𝑖).  Standard 
errors are clustered both by stock and date, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 





















𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  -15.25 -2.65 2.71 -0.84 0.53 0.00 -3.56 0.60 
 
(-3.32)*** (-0.26) (0.25) (-4.28)*** (4.72)*** (0.07) (-1.39) (0.16) 
𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡̂  8.84 -1.90 2.24 -1.74 0.54 -0.03 -8.10 14.61 
 
(1.18) (-0.20) (0.12) (-5.59)*** (3.13)*** (-0.98) (-2.09)** (2.87)*** 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.00 0.29 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 
(7.51)*** (3.59)*** (1.94)* (-2.05)** (38.31)*** (-1.13) (-0.85) (-1.48) 
$𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -4.56 -6.56 -2.52 -0.31 -4.51 0.01 0.25 0.68 
 
(-12.80)*** (-9.89)*** (-2.52)** (-21.03)*** (-18.46)*** (4.85)*** (1.11) (3.57)*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 182.18 272.43 -465.43 12.78 0.65 -0.45 157.56 -12.65 
 
(14.33)*** (14.75)*** (-13.22)*** (22.31)*** (15.83)*** (-11.50)*** (22.18)*** (-2.23)** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 -66.79 -41.68 -24.04 -1.28 -0.00 -0.07 -16.73 -1.11 
 
(-28.61)*** (-9.63)*** (-4.46)*** (-15.28)*** (-0.65) (-8.80)*** (-10.76)*** (-1.01) 
         
Observations 18,048 18,048 18,048 18,047 18,048 17,957 18,047 17,886 
Adjusted R
2
 26% 10% 6% 20% 23% 1% 16% 2% 






Fig. 1.  Dark trading in Canada as a percentage of consolidated dollar volume.  This figure shows daily dark 
trading in Canada as a fraction of total consolidated dollar volume for TSX Composite Index constituents from 
August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012.  The dark trading fraction is constructed by aggregating the dollar 
volume of dark trades executed and dividing it by the total dollar volume of trading on all of the main venues 
(TSX, Chi-X, Alpha, MatchNow, Intraspread, TMX Select, Pure Trading, and Omega).  The aggregation of 
trading volume uses proprietary data from MatchNow, Intraspread, Chi-X, Alpha and TSX.  The aggregation of 
dark trading volume does not include dark block trades executed on Liquidnet/Instinet.  The vertical bar 







Fig. 2.  Price improvement provided by dark trades.  This figure shows the fraction of dark trades 
providing different levels of price improvement around the introduction of the minimum price 
improvement rules in Canada (indicated by the vertical bar).  The sample comprises TSX Composite Index 
constituents from August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012.  Two-sided price improvement consists of trades 
executed with 10% and 20% price improvement relative to the prevailing NBBO (these trades are executed 
on MatchNow and Alpha Intraspread, respectively).  One-sided consists of trades executed at the midpoint 
of the NBBO, and could be executed on any of the dark venues.  NBBO Trades refers to trades larger than 
50 Standard Trading Units or $100,000 executed at the NBBO.  Such trades only became valid after the 




Panel A: Distribution of dark trading (as % of total volume) across stock-days  
 
Panel B: Distribution of changes in dark trading (as % of total volume) around the regulation  
 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of dark trading and changes in dark trading around the regulation.  Panel A 
shows the distribution of dark trading (as a % of total dollar volume), 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 , across stock-days.  The 
sample comprises TSX Composite Index constituents from August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012.  Values 
of 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 greater than 50% have been aggregated into the 50% bucket.  Panel B shows the distribution of 
changes in dark trading around the minimum price improvement regulation (the average of 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 before 
the regulation minus the average after the regulation for each stock) across stocks. 
 
  




















































Change in pre/post average 𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 
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Panel A: Distribution of changes in two-sided dark trading around the regulation 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of changes in one-sided dark trading around the regulation 
 
Fig. 4. Distributions of changes in the two types of dark trading around the regulation.  Panels A and 
B show the distributions of changes in the two types of dark trading around the minimum price 
improvement regulation (the average of 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (Panel A) and 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  (Panel B) before the 
regulation minus the average after the regulation for each stock) across stocks.  The sample comprises TSX 
Composite Index constituents from August 15, 2012 to December 15, 2012.  
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